According to the interactionist perspective, behavior is a result of the interaction between

3.1 The Interactionist Perspective

Interactionism developed under the early influence of the Scottish moral philosophers, George Herbert Mead, Charles Horton Cooley, W. I. Thomas. More recent influences include Blumer, Everett Hughes, Erving Goffman, Anselm Strauss, and Ralph Turner. Basic principles are ideas drawing on Mead. Subjectively held meanings are central to explaining or understanding social behavior. Meanings are products of persons' communication as they seek solutions to collective problems, and humans' capacity for symbolization. Of particular importance are meanings attached to self, others with whom persons interact, and situations of interaction; these guide interaction, and are altered in interaction. Implied is that who persons interact with under what circumstances is critical to the development of, and changes in, meanings and thus to interaction processes.

The centrality of meanings underwrites a basic methodological principle of interactionism: actors' definitions must be taken into account in examining their behavior. For many, this principle leads to viewing everyday life as the preferred arena of research; use of observational methods, ethnography, case histories, or intensive interviewing as preferred means of gathering data; and qualitative methods as preferred analysis procedures. Other interactionists, accepting the methodological principle involved, find these preferences unnecessarily limiting in their implied rejection of quantitative analyses of large-scale data sets for research stemming from interactionist premises.

Given these ideas, it is unsurprising that many interactionists attend to self, its dimensions or components, variability or stability, content under varying structural conditions, authenticity, efficacy, self-change, the social construction and interactional consequences of affect, the interactional sources and social behavioral resultants of self-esteem, interactional and symbolic processes in defense of self, the relation of self to physical and mental health, labeling, stigmatization, deviance, and a host of other topics. A related focus is on socialization, for the shaping of self is key to entrance into roles, normal and deviant. Attention is paid to socialization processes within institutional settings—family, school, work, etc., as well as settings that are not fully institutionalized, like child and adolescent play, informal friendship of young and old, or developing social movements, and noninstitutional settings like homelessness.

Responding to the insight that socialization is a life-long process, attention is accorded life-course related socialization processes. Interaction itself, of both intimates and nonintimates, is the focus of other interactionists, whose studies examine (among other topics) teasing among adolescents, language use both as and in action and interaction; variations in the implicit rules governing interaction and interaction strategies in various settings (Erving Goffman has been especially influential here and with reference to the preceding topic); role relationships within both formal and informal settings, and the impact of status and power inequalities on interaction.

Such long-standing interests of interactionists continue. A comparatively recent turn is an emphasis on emotions. Present in varying degrees in earlier interactionist social psychology, the expanded interest emphasizes emotion as basic to all interaction, expressed for example in David Heise's affect control theory; the role of affect in self-processes; the social construction and interactional consequences of emotion in general and particular emotions.

Other recent developments can only be mentioned. Contemporary sociological interest in culture is seen in work on the generation of culture through interaction. A ‘new look’ in social movement research makes framing processes and collective identity formation of particular consequence and has reinvigorated interactionist interests in that topic. A vision of self as comprised of multiple group or network based identities has opened up work on the consequences of consonant or conflicting identities that carries theory and analyses beyond traditional role-conflict studies.

4 Current Trends

Postmodern-informed interactionists not only have made dramatic methodological changes from Blumerian interactionism but are experimenting with radically different reporting styles, which are closely intertwined with the new methodological ethos. Some of these styles include poetry and performances, as well as the writing of short stories about one's personal past (autoethnographies). While some of these reports are highly engaging (Richardson 1997, Denzin 1999b), they raise a question about standards—should these works be judged and evaluated by the standards of sociology or poetry and literature? Some interactionists have been highly critical of postmodern-informed interactionism (Seidman 1991, Shalin 1993, Best 1995, Prus 1996). As a result the field of interactionism is currently divided in many groups with different methodological approaches.

Adler and Adler (1999), in describing the varied groups of interactionists at the turn of the millenium, use the metaphor of ‘the ethnographers’ ball’ and sit the factions at various tables. We will rely upon the Adlers' description in the following section. The first table sits the ‘postmodern-informed’ ethnographers, next to them is the ‘autoethnography group,’ a bit further down sit the ‘interpretive discourse analysts’ who attempt to integrate interactionism, ethnomethodology, and postmodernism. At another table the Adlers have the ‘classic interactionists,’ in the wake of the old Chicago School. Next to them sit the ‘no mo pomo’ (Adler and Adler 1999), the Blumerian group critical of the new postmodern influence. Near by are the followers of Erving Goffman, the ‘dramaturgists,’ studying everyday life by using the metaphor of the theater. They are followed by the ‘grounded theorists,’ next to the ‘conversational analysts’ who are continuing the work of ethnomethodologists such as the late Harvey Sacks and others. Next, the Adlers have a table for those who practice ‘the extended case study,’ using ethnography to do applied research. Finally we see the ‘visual interactionists' who capture symbolic interaction through the eye of the camera lens. As the Adlers themselves say, ‘the list can go on’ (Adler and Adler 1999).

We would add to the Adler's list three more tables, before we run out of room in the ballroom. One would be the ‘phenomenological/existential’ table sitting Jack Douglas and his former students at the San Diego campus of the University of California. Another table, right next to the postmodernists, would be the ‘feminist interactionists’ who are ‘united in their criticisms of “Eurocentric masculinist approaches”’ (Collins, quoted in Denzin 1997). Finally, there would be a table of ‘theoretical interactionists’ who have written extensively in the area without actually engaging in ethnographic work (cf. Lyman and Scott 1989).

The methodology of Symbolic Interactionism has become the methodologies of symbolic interactionism, and can no longer be grouped under Blumer's guiding ideas, yet their diversity is exaggerated and exacerbated by rivalry among various subgroups. By and large, while differing in some methodological points, the great majority of interactionists still wish to study the real world and the meaning that its members make of it and how they manage to maintain and achieve social order as a negotiated interactional accomplishment.

Current Trends

Postmodern-informed interactionists not only have made dramatic methodological changes from Blumerian interactionism but are experimenting with radically different reporting styles, which are closely intertwined with the new methodological ethos. Some of these styles include poetry and performances, as well as the writing of short stories about one's personal past (autoethnographies). While some of these reports are highly engaging (Richardson, 1997; Denzin, 1999b), they raise a question about standards – should these works be judged and evaluated by the standards of sociology or poetry and literature? Some interactionists have been highly critical of postmodern-informed interactionism (Seidman, 1991; Shalin, 1993; Best, 1995; Prus, 1996; Perrotta, 2004). As a result the field of interactionism is currently divided in many groups with different methodological approaches.

Adler and Adler (1999), in describing the varied groups of interactionists at the turn of the millenium, use the metaphor of ‘the ethnographers’ ball' and sit the factions at various tables. We will rely upon the Adlers' description in the following section. The first table sits the ‘postmodern-informed’ ethnographers, next to them is the ‘autoethnography group,’ a bit further down sit the ‘interpretive discourse analysts’ who attempt to integrate interactionism, ethnomethodology, and postmodernism. At another table the Adlers have the ‘classic interactionists,’ in the wake of the old Chicago School. Next to them sit the ‘no mo pomo’ (Adler and Adler, 1999), the Blumerian group critical of the new postmodern influence. Near by are the followers of Erving Goffman, the ‘dramaturgists,’ studying everyday life by using the metaphor of the theater. They are followed by the ‘grounded theorists,’ next to the ‘conversational analysts’ who are continuing the work of ethnomethodologists such as the late Harvey Sacks and others. Next, the Adlers have a table for those who practice ‘the extended case study,’ using ethnography to do applied research. Finally we see the ‘visual interactionists’ who capture symbolic interaction through the eye of the camera lens. As the Adlers themselves say, ‘the list can go on’ (Adler and Adler, 1999).

We would add to the Adlers' list three more tables, before we run out of room in the ballroom. One would be the ‘phenomenological/existential’ table placed near Jack Douglas and his former students at the San Diego campus of the University of California. Another table, right next to the postmodernists, would be the ‘feminist interactionists’ who are ‘united in their criticisms of “Eurocentric masculinist approaches”’ (Collins, quoted in Denzin, 1997). Finally, there would be a table of ‘theoretical interactionists’ who have written extensively in the area without actually engaging in ethnographic work (cf Lyman and Scott, 1989).

The methodology of Symbolic Interactionism has become the methodologies of symbolic interactionism, and can no longer be grouped solely under Blumer's guiding ideas, yet their diversity is exaggerated and exacerbated by rivalry among various subgroups (Fontana, 2005). By and large, while differing in some methodological points, the great majority of interactionists still wish to study the real world and the meaning that its members make of it and how they manage to maintain and achieve social order as a negotiated interactional accomplishment.

A Interactions and Evocative Environments

Thirty years ago, Richard Q. Bell (1968) introduced the idea of interactionism. Simply put, Bell reacted against the field’s overemphasis on the idea that, in socializing their children, the sole or predominant influences went from parents to children. In an article entitled “A re-examination of direction of effects in studies of socialization,” Bell presented the competing idea that children also strongly influence their parents’ behaviors. Studies of mother-child and father-child interaction, of peer relations, and of other types of interactions ail arose following Bell’s influential writings.

Partly due to its beginnings as a reaction against socialization studies, most interactional work has examined how children affect adults. Such effects arise in a variety of ways. Parents seem influenced by the nature, level, and tempo of their children’s behaviors. Examining interactions between mothers and their 3-monthold infants, Brazelton, Koslowski, and Main (1974) noted that such face-to-face games involve back-and-forth behavioral reactions by both mother and infant. Although in some sense mothers lead the games, infants pace interactions due to their own behaviors and underlying abilities to respond to information. Mothers then match their behaviors to the pace of their infant (Hodapp & Mueller, 1982). Thus, if the infant becomes overstimulated, mothers decrease their behaviors or even break off the face-to-face interaction altogether. As a result of mother-and-child mutual control over each other, dyads behave in synchrony one with the other.

In addition to reacting to the child’s behavior, adults also react to many status variables of their children. Even after the most minimal of contact after birth, for example, adults differently describe male versus female newborns, simply based on their perceptions of gender roles and behaviors (Rubin, Provenzano, & Luria, 1974). In essence, it is not only the child’s behaviors per se that influence adults, but adults’ own perceptions and reactions. As Bell (1979) noted, parent-child interactions involve a “thinking parent” as well as an active, thinking child.

A second view of child effects comes from behavior genetics. Scarr (1993) described three senses of interactions between genes (i.e., child) and environment. In the first instance, one can envision a passive child and an active environment. To some extent, children (especially when younger) are somewhat passive recipients of their parents’ decisions to place them in day care, to move to a new house or town, or to introduce them to new playmates.

A second type of child-environment interaction reverses the equation, this time focusing on an active child and a passive environment. Especially in later childhood, one sees how adolescents increasingly choose their friends, their interests, and their activities. As adolescents become older, their decisions gain increasing weight, until as adults they themselves will choose with whom, where, and how they will live their lives.

But it is a third sense of the environment that is most interesting in terms of genetic disorders’ indirect effects. As various studies have shown, children also elicit their own environments. To take several extreme examples, why is it that certain children—and not others—within a family become targets of child abuse? Most studies show that abused children are more likely to be born prematurely, to have disabilities such as mental retardation and hyperactivity, or to have temperamental characteristics such as irritability, fussiness, and dependency (see Pianta, Egeland, & Erickson, 1990, for a review). Granted, the vast majority of children who are premature, retarded, or who have difficult temperaments are not abused. Nevertheless, certain child characteristics increase the odds of abuse.

Conversely, consider children at risk because they have grown up in chaotic, impoverished, or otherwise unstable households. In Werner’s (1993) long-term study of children on the island of Kauai, she found that many of these children adjusted well by early adulthood. But resilient adults showed several personal characteristics along the way: even as toddlers, these resilient children were more likely to exhibit a positive social orientation and to be alert and autonomous. During grade school, teachers reported that these children got along well with peers, and as high schoolers, these children developed a positive self-concept and an internal locus of control.

See also:

Freud, Sigmund (1856–1939); Genetic Studies of Personality; Infant and Child Development, Theories of; Interactionism and Personality; Personality and Adaptive Behaviors; Personality and Conceptions of the Self; Personality and Crime; Personality and Marriage; Personality and Risk Taking; Personality and Social Behavior; Personality Assessment; Personality Development and Temperament; Personality Development in Adulthood; Personality Development in Childhood; Personality Psychology; Personality Psychology: Methods; Personality Structure; Psychological Development: Ethological and Evolutionary Approaches; Social Learning, Cognition, and Personality Development

6 Interactionism

Although the intellectual debate has been cast in terms of whether the trait or the situation is the main cause of behavior, this is merely a matter of emphasis: Most experts believe in interactionism, which is the doctrine that behavior is an interactive product of the person and the situation (see Interactionism and Personality). Put another way, hardly anyone believes that traits are so powerful that people will always behave the same way regardless of situation, nor does anyone really believe that there are no meaningful differences among individuals.

The interaction between person and situation is implicit in several of the formulations already noted, such as the idea that personality dictates the selection of particular situations, and then the situations guide actual behavior. An explicit interactionism would assert that any approach is doomed if it focuses on merely the person or merely the situation. A crowded, noisy party will make some people mingle happily with the crowd and enjoy shouted discussions with groups of people, while others retreat to search for a quiet place where they can talk at length with a single person. Likewise, a major upcoming test will strike some people as a threat, making them so anxious that they avoid studying, whereas others will embrace the test as a challenge and prepare to do their best. Thus, seemingly identical situations elicit very different behaviors from different people, depending on their personalities.

Modern statistical techniques allow the observations of human behavior to be divided into three parts. Trait and situation each claim a share, and the interaction (between trait and situation) gets the third share. The trait share refers to how much behavior is affected directly by personality, independent of the situation (and thus consistently across different situations). The situation share involves how much all different people will give essentially the same response to the situation. Last, the interaction encompasses ways that the same situation affects different people differently.

There is unfortunately no general principle or agreement as to which of these three shares is generally the largest. It appears that some situations are quite powerful in affecting everyone the same way. Other situations are relatively weak (such as unstructured situations), and traits exert considerable influence there. Interactions do not always occur, but they are common and often generate the most interest, insofar as different people react in reliably different ways.

2 Contrasting Modularity and Interactionism

A significant part of interactionist accounts of cognition concerns the sensor-motor interactions of the individual with her environment; see, for example, Brooks (1991). However, the other part of interactionism is that the study of cognition irreducibly depends on an analysis of a social interaction. A crucial idea is that structure is created as a product of a social interaction, and is modified and accumulates within a community of actors across generations. Thus special purpose, hardwired, evolutionarily designed, input modules can be seen as producing one set of structures and social interaction and cultural history another set of structures (Cole 1996, p. 198–214).

Table 1 shows three contrasting points between the assumptions underlying modularity and interactionism. Modularity accounts assume, as a basic unit of analysis, a reduction of mind to what goes on in the head; for example, language can be analyzed independent of communication. Interactionist accounts assume interaction, especially social interaction, as the basic unit of analysis. ‘Mind arises through communication by a conversation of gestures in a social process or context of experience—not communication through mind’ (Mead 1934, p. 50). The sources (roots) of intelligence do not only move upwards, from the biological, but also downwards, from social to cognitive (Vygotsky 1978). The study of cognition must be anchored into larger units of analysis than the individual; units that include the sociotechnical (Hutchins 1995a). Cognition is inextricably tied to activity (Suchman 1987); it emerges from an interaction (Agre 1997). It includes the context, and not just its internalization (Lave 1988).

Table 1. Contrasting Modularity and Interactionism

A second point of contrast concerns the difference between structure as biologically determined and external structures that emerge as a product of human activity. The focus of interactionist accounts is best exemplified by the analyses of the structure of behavior. For an interactionist account, much of the structure of behavior emerges from an interaction, e.g., Garfinkel (1967), Suchman (1987), and Agre (1997). Context, knowledge, and ‘seeing’ depend on interaction with structures in the world (Lave 1988, Hutchins 1995a, 1995b, Goodwin and Goodwin 1996).

The final contrasting point concerns the historical aspects of cognition. Modularity proponents ground cognition in genetics and physical evolution, and interactionists focus on the aspects of cognition that are the product of a social, cultural, and historic interaction within a community of actors. The full ambit of activities is culturally and historically conditioned, ranging from simple activities like greeting a friend on the telephone to complex cognitive performances like reading a newspaper to physical activities like skiing. In each of these cases, cognitive performance is tied to the performance of this activity by prior generations of individuals within the community. Acquisition of the structure of a given activity depends on the individual internalizing a structure for the activity from somebody else who already knows how to perform the activity (Vygotsky 1978). Examples of models of cultural learning that depend on interaction include Hutchins (1995a), Lave and Wenger (1991), Alterman et al. (1998), and Tomasello et al. (1993).

These differences in assumption lead to some critical differences in viewpoint. Consider the case of language learning, which is critical to Chomsky's (1980) argument for a language module. Chomsky uniformly dismisses the ‘performance’ aspects of language learning, arguing that children acquire the grammar for a language even though it is ‘vastly undetermined by the available evidence.’ For interactionists, semantics, reference, and conversation are all jointly engineered among participants in a social interaction (see, e.g., Clark 1996, Hanks 1996, Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs 1986, Sacks et al. 1974). Whether language and its structure can be reduced to an analysis independent of semantics and the social interaction in which language (and language learning) occurs is a point of debate.

With regard to Fodor's version of modularity, the issue pivots over the difference between a ‘language of thought’ and the structure of thinking. In Fodor's view, central processes work from internal representations. An input module produces a logical form, which is the language of thought. Contrast that to Vygotsky's view that thought, memory, and planning all begin with a social interaction. The structure of thinking depends on the history of such an activity within a community of actors. Consider the example of literacy. The reasoning processes of literacy are dependent on internalization of the structure of the ‘reading’ activity. To become literate is to tap into the culture of the activity of ‘reading’ within a given community (Scribner and Cole 1978). How this practice emerges may differ between communities. Additionally, many interactionists argue against the notion of internal representations of the sort a ‘language of thought’ argument supports; see a special issue of Cognitive Science (1993) for a debate on this issue.

The Karmiloff-Smith (1992) model has interactionist elements, but it does not account for the social elements of the representational structures acquired during the child's development. Consider a task like learning to play the piano. It is true that part of ‘learning to play the piano’ depends on sensor-motor interactions. But it is also true that it depends on the social interaction with a teacher and the representations provided by the musical score, which is the product of a social interaction. In other words, the child's participation in an ongoing social interaction within a community of actors is a significant factor in the development of high-level representations of the sort that allow for conscious access to knowledge and explanation. Even the more flexible access to knowledge that would be required, say, by jazz improvisation on the piano, is dependent on structures created by a social interaction; e.g., compare bebop to modal forms of jazz improvisation.

Holistic–Interactionistic Approach

David Magnusson (1999) in his theory puts an emphasis on the integration of an individual and the holistic approach to examining development. He was not only influenced by other developmental systems theories but also by Gestalt psychology, for example. According to the holistic interactionism human development is based on four pillars: interactionism, holism, interdisciplinarity, and longitudinal study. A person does not exist in the environment merely as a passive object; on the contrary, the individual rather exists as an active and conscious part of the context system. Within the system a person develops and operates as an integrated, comprehensive and dynamic unit. We cannot understand the functioning of the environment without taking into consideration the person in it. At the same time, it is not possible to understand an individual's functioning and development without understanding the environment (Magnusson and Stattin, 2006).

The holistic perspective of development is a consequence of gaps in the research so far. Criticism applies especially to fragmentation (excessive specialization without integration), emphasis on variables, prediction (the principal objective of examining personality), unidirectional causality, prevalence of statistics over analysis of the phenomenon and an insufficient link between theory and empirical research. On the other hand, the holistic view describes personality as a living, active, and purposeful organism, functioning and evolving as a comprehensive integrated being. The modern holistic interactionism follows the classical interactionism, an approach that emerged in the 1970s (Endler and Magnusson, 1976).

According to the interaction theory the developmental system functions as a whole. The features of the totality are a result of interactions between all parts of the system. Simpler processes taking place in the system (such as emotional changes) take less time than more complex processes (such as changes in the relationship between the person and the environment). In the life course the system undergoes constant restructuring at all levels. Any process taking place within the system, however, is directed by certain laws. Activities of all parts of the system are coordinated in such a way that each subsystem works toward achieving the goals of the whole system. In the context of a developing system the holistic interactionism describes the principle of so-called amplification of minimal effects. This principle is related to the long-term influence of marginal deviations from the norms of behavior or appearance of a person. Such deviations can cause reactions from the proximal social environment, for example, social isolation in the group as a result of an aggressive behavior. These reactions from the environment may be one of the sources of recurring malfunction in the interaction between an individual and the environment, which can potentiate the maladaptive behavior to a pathological level (Magnusson and Stattin, 2006).

We can analyze the human behavior and experience from three different perspectives: current (synchronic), developmental (diachronic), and evolutionary. The holistic interactionism focuses on the first two perspectives: current and developmental. The model for current functioning is concerned with why people behave in a certain way, in terms of their current psychological and biological dispositions. Developmental models explain the current functioning on the basis of individual developmental history (Magnusson, 1999). In order to understand the current functioning completely we need to understand the conditions of development.

Environment is a key term in models that deal with the current functioning and development. The holistic interactionism sees the environment as a holistic, integrated, and organized system hierarchically structured (Magnusson and Stattin, 2006). However, the objective environment is not so important; it is more important how it is perceived and interpreted. Individual perception and interpretation of the external world is shaped by the actual (objective) environment. This approach does not evaluate an individual and the environment as isolated elements. It explores the relationship between people and their environment, which they helped to create to some extent (Magnusson, 1999). In the integrated person–context system the person acts as an active agent. This does not mean that we cannot examine its specific characteristics, such as aspiration level, physical performance, or current genesis of emotion. We should, however, include them in the overall functioning of the system and take into account their role in its activity (Magnusson and Stattin, 2006).

1.4 Ford, Lerner, and a “DST”

The phrase DST came from Ford and Lerner (1992), who set a systematic research agenda for developmental psychology that incorporated many of the themes introduced earlier. They defined development itself in a way that placed organism–environment interaction at its core. Development consisted of a series of functional transformations of the organism produced by the interaction of the current state of the person with their current context.

One of the core theses of Ford and Lerner’s DST was developmental contextualism, which they recognized as closely related to Gottlieb’s concept of probabilistic epigenesis (Ford & Lerner, 1992, p. 11). Rather than reduce one level of causal analysis to another, or treat one level as focal and the others as background against which it unfolds, contextualism treated development as a process that proceeded at several levels and treated interaction between levels as the prime focus of research. Another core thesis was dynamic interactionism, as opposed to static interactionism. This contrast was closely related to the contrast between organism–environment interaction and gene–environment interaction mentioned earlier. Ford and Lerner stressed that interaction was an ongoing process in which the interactants were themselves transformed, so that what was interacting later in the process depended on the earlier phases of interaction.

Ford and Lerner linked the idea of a developmental system to systems theory and cybernetics. The dynamics of the system played an important role in explaining development. This emphasis on a systems level of explanation provides a link back to the ideas of Waddington, with whom we started. Because Waddington’s approach was more internalist than contextualist, it may seem odd that he has been regarded so positively by DST. What Waddington shared with Ford and Lerner, however, was their dynamic interactionism and the realization that this form of explanation depended on a rigorous theory of systems.

Starting in the 1990s, there was an explosion of interest in DST in the philosophy of science, mostly in response to the work of Susan Oyama (Gray, 1992; Griffiths & Gray, 1994; Godfrey-Smith, 2000; Moss, 1992; Robert, 2001). However, this interest was aroused by the implications of DST for causation and explanation in genetics. So while most scientific work in the DST framework has been on behavioral development, and much of it on human development, philosophical discussion of DST has focused on its application to molecular biology, or to developmental biology with its traditional emphasis on embryology (Robert, 2001, 2003, 2004; Stotz, 2006, 2008).

VI CONCLUSION: THE ORIGINS OF KNOWLEDGE

In light of the evidence reviewed here, the two classic philosophical answers to the origins of knowledge are clearly both wrong. The activity-dependent processes seen in neural development an in perceptual and cognitive development suggest neither a tabula rasa nor innate ideas. In one way, this hardly seems newsworthy, since it has become commonplace to give lip service to interactionism. However, to date, there has been little earnest attention paid to the processes of self-organization, to the history of “interactions” that make development and knowledge. The advancing discoveries reviewed here suggest that the time is ripe for the serious study of developmental process and for the final retirement of the old “saws” of learned and innate. The activity-dependent processes of living organisms suggest that knowing is the dynamic product of a moment in time—a product that integrates immediate sensory input, current internal activity, and the developmental and evolutionary history of the organism.