Latane, B., & Darley, J. Bystander "Apathy", American Scientist, 1969, 57, 244-268. This paper is about bystander apathy and the researchers experiments. The Kitty Genovese murder in 1964 where 38 neighbors watched and listened but did not act to help or call police shocked the nation. However, the neighbors reactions were not much different than in other emergency situations where people "watch the drama in helpless fascination". Why do people who are so willing to help in non-emergency situations don't in emergency situations? Characteristics of Emergencies A Model of the Intervention Process Of course, in a real emergency a person isn't so rational as this. Also, his decisions affect himself as much as the victim. The bystander can only gain with pride and a hero's status -- but he risks being a failure, getting sued, or even attacked or wounded himself. Social Determinants to Bystander Intervention Males are expected to react to stress by being calm and collected. If they react to the emergency by intial calm inaction, this may be interpreted by others as an assessment of non-emergency. A 'pluralistic ignorance" my develop. Thus, people may react less to an emergency if they are in a group situation than if they are alone. Experiment 1. Where There's Smoke, There's (Sometimes) Fire 75% of alone subjects calmly noticed the smoke and left the room to report it. But only 10% of the subjects with confederates reported it. Surprisingly, in the three naive bystander condition only 38% reported the smoke. Most subjects had similar initial reactions. Those that didn't report it all concluded that the smoke wasn't dangerous or was part of the experiment. No one attributed their inactivity to the presence of others in the room. Other studies have shown that togetherness reduces fear even when the danger isn't reduced. It may have been that people in groups were less afraid and thus less likely to act. Or people were inhibited to show fear in a group situation. However, from post-interviews it was clear that people didn't act because they concluded the situation wasn't a threatening situation. Experiment 2: Lady in Distress They measured the % who took action and how long it took them to act. Results 70% of alone subjects reacted, but only 7% of those with passive confederates reacted. The subjects with confederates became confused and frequently looked over at the confederate. Only 40% of stranger pairs offered to help. 70% of friend pairs helped (same as alone group), which shows some inhibition because given the 70% alone rate we would expect a 91% rate with no inhibition. The interveners claimed they acted because the fall seemed serious and it was "the right thing to do". The non-interveners said they were unsure what happened but decided it wasn't serious, and some felt they didn't want to embarass the researcher. Again, people felt they weren't highly influence by others in the room. The results confirm results in the Smoke study. It seems that the risk of inappropriate behavior is less with friends, and friends are less likely to develop "pluralistic ignorance". Experiment 3: The Case of the Stolen Beer The staged a shoplifiting theft of a case of beer at a liqour store. They had two variables - one or two customers in the store, and one or two "robbers". Overall 20% of subjects reported the theft spontaneously, and 51% reported upon prompting by the store owner (who had gone in the back during the robbery). One or two robbers made no difference. Sex made no difference. 65% of single customers reported the theft. But only 56% of two-customer setups made a report (less than expected). Social Determinants of Bystander Intervention, II If there are multiple people at an emergency, the overall responsibility for one individual is reduced. Or they may assume that others have already responded to the emergency, so no one acts first. Experiment 4: A Fit to Be Tied They put a naive subject in a room and told him that they were to talk with others about normal stress problems with other student who were similarily in isolated rooms to ostensibly preserve anonymity. Actually, all the other students were on tape. One of the other students became a victim that suffers a seizure and calls for help. They varied the perceived number of people in the discussion group for two people (subject and victim), three person, and six person. They also varied the three person group by changing the other bystander (female, male, and a male pre-med student with emergency training). Finally, they set up two more conditions. One with the subject and a real friend as bystanders, and one where six real subjects had prior contact and a brief "encounter" with the percieved victim. 95% of all subjects responded within the first 3 minutes. 85% of perceived alone subjects left their cubicle before the victim finished speaking to report it. Only 31% who thought there were four other bystanders did so. 100% in the two real person condition, but only 62% in the six person condition reported the emergency. Sex of bystander and medical competence had no effect on the results. Being in the perceived presence of a friend significantly increase the speed of response. It seems that responsibility does not diffuse across friends. Also people who had briefly met the victim were significantly more likely to respond quicker to his pleas. It seemed the ability to visualize the victim help spur action. Even those who didn't report the emergency showed signs of genuine concern. They were often nervous and trembling. They seemed to be in a state of indecision about responding. Again, subjects were aware of others, but did not think they influenced their thinking. Social Determinants of Bystander Intervention III |