What is the significance of ownership concentration within the media industry?

II.B Media Concentration

The salient expression of the media concentration process in Israel, as in other countries, is the growth of large corporations. At the center of Israel's contemporary media map, we find three large, privately owned corporations with at least two points in common: each is controlled entirely or mainly by a single family and each has a flagship in the form of a daily newspaper. Together, these corporations control, alone or jointly with others, the media's seven markets: daily press, local press, periodicals, cable TV, commercial TV (the Second Channel), billboards, and the music industry (CDs and videocassettes). In certain cases, one member of this group single-handedly controls an entire market. All three hold significant shares in the media's eighth market: book publishing.

The Mozes family holds a majority share in Israel's largest media corporation, which is also Israel's largest privately owned corporation. At its center is the country's most popular daily newspaper, Yediot Aharonot, with a two thirds share of the market (unprecedented in the entire Western world). The corporation is, inter alia, comprised of a Russian-language daily newspaper, a sister-publication in Hebrew which is published in the United States, an online newspaper, and a Web site, some 15 local newspapers, 10 periodicals, a book publishing company, a partnership in concessionaries of the Second Channel and cable TV, partnerships in a music company, a billboard company, and many other interests. The partner of the Mozes family in this corporation is also the owner of a daily newspaper geared to financial news. This is an example of a cross-media corporation which exercises its control on a broad range of media channels—daily newspapers, periodicals, publishing, television, music, and advertising.

The second largest media corporation, built around Ma'ariv, is part of a larger corporation, Hahsharat Hayishuv, owned by the Nimrodi family. This media corporation is, inter alia, comprised of a sister-daily published in the United States, an online newspaper, approximately 10 local newspapers, partnerships with concessionaries of the Second Channel and cable TV, a book publishing company, a music company, and a billboard company. The parent company, of which the media corporation is a part, includes real estate businesses, construction, hotels, etc. and is an example of a cross-industry corporation whose operations extend to other industries and are not focused exclusively in the media.

The fierce rivalry between the two largest media corporations has exceeded the boundaries of commercialism or journalism. In the 1990s, the Israeli Police conducted a series of complex investigations, following suspicions that the two Israeli media barons heading these corporations, along with journalists and other senior employees of their respective newspapers, were involved in commissioning illegal wiretaps and listening to illegally obtained telephone call recordings, primarily for purposes of industrial espionage or prevention of counterespionage efforts. Following the police investigation, the editor in chief of the popular Yediot Aharonot and the owner–editor in chief of its main rival, Ma'ariv, were put on trial. The editor in chief of Yediot Aharonot, who was forced to suspend himself from this position following his indictment, was convicted of listening to illegal wiretap recordings and was given a two-month suspended sentence and a fine of NIS 4000 (approximately USD 800), after which he resumed his former position. The same newspaper's managing editor was convicted and sentenced to three months of community service and a fine of NIS 10,000 (approximately $2000). The owner of Ma'ariv, charged with commissioning wiretaps, was sentenced to prison for eight months. One year later, he was again arrested on new charges and this time sentenced to 25 months. Following his indictment, he suspended himself from his editorial position on the newspaper and later suspended himself from the position of publisher. The wiretap incident and the sentencing of publishers and editors shocked the press circles in Israel and it is estimated that several years will elapse before the scars of this affair heal.

The third corporation, owned by the Shoken family, includes, inter alia, the Ha'aretz daily newspaper, an online newspaper, approximately 10 local newspapers, a book publishing company, and a partnership in a joint venture with an international newspaper (Herald Tribune). Despite several failed attempts to branch into television and radio, the concentration of its operations in one medium of the mass media—the print press—illustrates a concentrated industry.

The development of Israel's media map indicates a further noteworthy phenomenon: the entrance of international corporations into local media operations, although only in two cases have overseas companies acquired complete control of Israeli media organizations: Hollinger acquired the English language Jerusalem Post and U.S. millionaire Ron Lauder acquired Ulpani Habira (Capital Studios). Foreign investments, however, have been channeled into investments into television's Second Channel, cable TV, regional radio stations, and advertising agencies. It is feasible that as the government implements its intended open skies policy as planned—i.e., the privatization of television broadcasts and permits for additional players to establish new channels and make new investments—additional international media corporations may be attracted to Israel to expand their business interests.

IV.B Media Concentration Rules

Concern about the possible negative effects of media concentration on economic competition and editorial pluralism is reflected in a number of regulatory measures. In the press sector it is generally accepted that editorial pluralism exists by dint of the large number of publications available. However, in 1976 the government acted to safeguard economic competition in the sector by amending the Federal Cartel Act to make the thresholds for notification of mergers to the Federal Cartel Office lower for the press than for other sectors of the economy, DM 25 million rather than DM 500 million. Subsequently, the competition authority has intervened on several occasions to block press mergers. The most noteworthy instance occurred in 1981 when the Cartel Office blocked Burda from taking a 25% stake in the Springer press group on the grounds that the merger of two of the largest press groups in the Federal Republic would have created a degree of concentration that was, from an economic point of view, unacceptable.

As for the broadcasting sector, it was clear from the start that the principal investors in private broadcasting were press and other media interests, including some very large and influential ones (Springer, Bertelsmann, Kirch, etc.). In its Fourth TV Judgement of 1986 the Federal Constitutional Court made clear the need for measures to prevent the appearance of “dominant influence over the expression and formation of opinion” (vorherrschende Meinungsmacht). Consequently, the Inter-Land Agreement on the Restructuring of Broadcasting of 1987, providing the framework rules for the dual broadcasting system, introduced some moderate limits on both the accumulation of broadcasting licenses and the size of shareholdings in broadcasting companies. These rules (amended slightly by the second such inter-Land Agreement, that of 1991), however, proved difficult for the Landesmedienanstalten to implement and were also seen by key politicians in the Länder as well as by the leading media companies themselves as unhelpful to the development of their—and Germany's—economic ambitions in the media field.

As a result, the rules were radically revised by the third Inter-Land Agreement on the dual broadcasting system of 1996, which came into force on January 1, 1997. It allows any enterprise to acquire any number of broadcasting outlets and to gain 100% control of these, provided that the aggregate audience share of the channels in which the enterprise has an interest of 25% or more remains below 30% of the total national television audience. Any individual channel that has an audience share of at least 10% of the national television audience is obliged to make provision for the inclusion in its schedule of “window programs” for small independent broadcasters. A new authority called the Commission for the Investigation of Media Concentration (Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration, KEK) has been established to monitor media concentration, to identify any cases where pluralism is endangered, and to recommend any necessary action (e.g., such as divestment of interests); to this end, the KEK produces very thorough annual reports. The KEK is a joint, independent organ of the FRG's 15 Land-based regulatory authorities for private broadcasting, the Landesmedienanstalten, who may only override a KEK ruling with a three-quarters majority vote (i.e., 12 out of 15).

VII Conclusions

Media industries in Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay are in a state of flux. The consolidation of democracy ushered in new conditions that positively affected news reporting, notwithstanding many limitations and the difficulties existing in the newspaper industry. Policy decisions, however, have stimulated media concentration which creates a number of problems for democratic life. Privatization, liberalization, and the opening of new broadcasting licenses have changed the media landscape. In the context of preexisting media exchanges, those policies have intensified cross-border flows of programming and capital. Regionally, Argentine companies run with a significant advantage over media firms in Paraguay and Uruguay given the fact that they are based in a wealthier and larger media market. The latter are not defenseless, however. In alliance with governments, they have been able to protect their existing domestic positions. Because governments and media mutually need each other, political alliances at the national level continue to be important in taming regional and global flows of capital.

In these countries, the future of the media hinges on pending regulatory decisions. Full deregulation of telecommunications and cable would likely trigger more joint ventures between old and new media companies and intensify conglomeration. The possible removal of protectionist measures such as limits on foreign ownership would deepen this process. If this happens, budding alliances among media, telecommunication, and Internet companies domestically and across countries are likely to continue. This would intensify “survival of the fittest” dynamics in which a foreign and local handful of content providers and owners of distribution lines prevail. The absence of antitrust legislation, which reflects the long absence of a conception of public interest in media issues, makes this scenario possible. Without protection, local and independent production faces an uphill battle in competing with established and well-funded regional and international programmers to have access to cable and satellite systems. The return of democracy in Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay has not opened wide possibilities for media democratization but, instead, has been the backdrop for increased concentration of media and information resources.

IV.B.3 Federal Trade Commission

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is an independent agency of the U.S. government charged with the responsibility of working for consumer protection and a competitive marketplace. Although its jurisdiction is the United States and it has little to say about transnational corporate practices, a major piece of the FTC's own agenda is continually focused on controversies about media concentration within the United States. It fits within its mandate to examine business mergers from the perspective of antitrust and competition.

One example is the AOL/Time Warner merger. It was a $111 billion agreement. The merger occurred in 2000 and at that time was the largest merger in American history. The FTC was required to determine whether that merger would interfere with industry competition before the legal process could be completed. The FTC approved the merger with the stipulation that, wherever AOL launches its own broadband service, it must within 90 days make it possible for at least three other Internet service providers (ISPs) to use the AOL/Time Warner cable modem to access the Internet. Time Warner, at the time of the merger, had more than 12 million cable customers and could reach 21 million households.

SPECIAL FEATURES OF IN VITRO MODELS

Treatments that induce seizures in animals and humans often induce only relatively short recurrent discharges in slice preparations. This important “discrepancy” is most notably the case with agents that interfere with GABAergic or glycinergic synaptic transmission, such as strychnine, bicuculline, penicillin, etc. By contrast, agents that block potassium currents, such as 4-aminopyridine (4-AP), barium, and cesium, are more likely to induce seizure-like events, as is the case in vivo (Avoli and Perreault, 1987). Conditions where changes in Mg and Ca bathing medium concentrations are used to induce seizure-like events bear some relationship to eclamptic seizures. In such cases, opening the blood-brain barrier as a consequence of sudden surges in blood pressure leads to a hypomagnesaemia and a hypocalcaemia in the interstitial space of the central nervous system (CNS), which in turn may contribute to ictogenesis (Thomas, 1998). Delayed inactivation of sodium currents, as observed with veratridine, can induce ictal events both in vivo and in vitro (Alkadhi and Tian, 1996). Based on these observations, it appears that interference with intrinsic neuronal excitability is more likely to result in seizure-like generation in vitro than is interference with synaptic transmission.

It should also be noted that most seizure models are used in otherwise healthy tissue. Little information is yet available about seizure characteristics in chronically epileptic tissue. For example, it remains unclear why we were unable to induce seizure-like events in slices from human epileptic tissue with low-Mg2+ bathing medium, bicuculline, 4-AP, and other agents, but potassium-evoked seizure-like events were generated (Gabriel et al., 2004). Such observations raise the possibility that adaptive homeostatic plastic changes develop in chronically epileptic tissue, which prevents frequent occurrence of seizures. Understanding such mechanisms might open new strategies for the cure of epilepsies.

14.4.2 Concentrated Ownership and Pluralism: Cause and Effect

As we have noted, concentration of media ownership in the hands too few individuals or firms is problematic because of ‘the potential risks they pose to diversity of ideas, tastes and opinions’ (Meier and Trappel, 1998, p. 38). Many scholars have focused attention on these risks, including the abuse of political power by media owners or the under-representation of some important viewpoints (Murdock and Golding, 1977; MacLeod, 1996; Humphreys, 1997; Demers, 1999; Baker, 2007). However, it should be acknowledged that in practice surprisingly little empirical research has been carried out to pinpoint the exact cause-and-effect relationship between concentrations of media ownership and pluralism. As observed by Eli Noam, ‘[w]hen it comes to media concentration, views are strong, theories abound, but numbers are scarce’ (Noam, 2009, p. 3). Indeed, the extent to which large and diversified media conglomerates add to or detract from diversity of content and consumer choice is debatable. It is certainly possible that media conglomerates can have a positive impact on diversity of media output; for example, if the scale of resources available to a large firm enables it to invest in innovation or if its financial strength enables it to support or cross-subsidize a temporarily loss-making product (Doyle, 2002b, pp. 23–26). Theoretically, the additional capital and mix of expertise available to large, diversified media conglomerates ought to be advantageous when it comes to launching new products. On the other hand, in a digital media environment, the extent to which innovation of attractive new products and services really requires extensive initial capital investment is open to question; many successful new services such as Facebook are not the outcome of heavy corporate investment. It is also questionable whether monopolistic ownership structures serve to encourage creativity and a risk-taking management culture (Doyle, 2002b, p. 25). The complexities and challenges that beset media organizations as they grow larger are well recognized (Sánchez-Tabernero and Carvajal, 2002), and growth may in some cases impede flexibility and the propensity for entrepreneurship.

In fact, whether a media merger is likely to widen or narrow consumer choice and diversity is largely determined by how the transaction serves to change the way in which the resources involved in content production within the merged entity are organized and managed. If the integration of back-office activities and support functions (e.g. finance) that have no bearing on content production enables resources to be freed up and transferred into better quality and more diverse content, this will impact favorably on diversity and on consumer interests. However, if on the other hand, a merger encourages consolidation and sharing of editorial functions or more recycling of product content, this will harm rather than benefit diversity and pluralism (Doyle, 2002b, p. 24). To the extent that common ownership makes it more feasible or financially more attractive for elements of the same content and editorial approach to be embodied in ‘different’ media products, cross-ownership will impact negatively on diversity.

Thus, the relationship between media empire-building and pluralism is somewhat difficult to pinpoint, not least because, as illustrated in Fig. 14.1, the existence of media concentrations is just one (important) component in a much wider framework of interrelated issues that have some sort of impact on pluralism, whether positive or negative (Doyle, 1998, 2002b, pp. 13–29). For example, the size and wealth of a market is one inescapable determinant of how many suppliers there are and what level of diversity within media provision is affordable. The state of technology (e.g. which platforms for distribution are available and how widely accessible they are) is another crucial determinant. A key point is that while concentrations of media ownership and of media power pose a risk of imbalances within the media that threaten democracy and social cohesion, they are not the only factors that have a bearing on levels of pluralism. Hence, ownership rules generally need to be backed up by other measures such as subsidies for minority media, editorial agreements, and support for public service broadcasting.

Media Ownership and Media Control

Many critics view what they think is wrong with media as tied to their ownership. Liberal commentator Thomas Frank, for example, says that “the link between media ownership, the drive for profit, and the media’s insulting content should be obvious to anyone with ears to hear.” But ownership and control (let alone content) are not the same thing. People’s use of their property operates within certain social and legal limitations. But what if the law fails (through incompetence, oversight, or corruption) to enforce appropriate limitations? Anti-corporate critics often argue that the economic power of the corporation is such as to allow it to prevent, evade, and override legal limits through the exercise of political influence.

Journalist William Greider argues that legal regulation fails because those familiar with the system know their goals can be achieved through intervention, licit or illicit, at many points in the path from law to enforcement. The interpretations of administrators can function to nullify, even to reverse, the intended effect of a statute. Indeed, politicians often legislate merely symbolic gestures, whose actual effect in practice they know will be (sometimes they count on its being) quite different. As politico Stuart Eizenstat explained to Greider, “The law’s always up for grabs. That’s why you win elections and appoint judges” (Greider, 1992: 148). Greider himself endorses Bagdikian’s recommendation that limits be placed on cross-ownership of media, noting:

Media owners usually hide behind the First Amendment when such questions are raised, but the practical effect of media concentration is actually to restrict the ‘free speech’ of everyone else, the voiceless citizenry. Who gets to enter the debate? The choice belongs to reporters and editors and producers and, really, to the companies they work for. (Greider, 1992: 329)

Those not alarmed by Bagdikian’s dwindling list of media owners can insist that ownership is not the same as control for another reason. Operating a media enterprise is a large and complex business, in which many individuals leave (to varying degrees) their mark on what happens. Does the corporation’s ownership really determine the choices of its many agents, the reporters, editors, producers, etc.? Martin Seiden, in Access to the American Mind: The Impact of the New Mass Media (1991), dismisses Bagdikian’s worries and sees the problem with media as being the power of journalists, rather than the power of their corporate owners:

The real corporate conspiracy would appear to be the corporations’ bond of uncritical silence regarding the operation of their media. … What sensible executive would jeopardize his company’s profit-and-loss statement by triggering a strike because he took issue with one of the journalists’ sacred causes? (Seiden, 1991: xiii)

There have been many versions of this debate, some focusing on the alleged political biases of reporters: see, for example, Eric Alterman’s What Liberal Media? (2003).

Analyses of this kind can also point to pollsters, lawyers, and other minions of corporate power – indeed, even to corporate executives themselves, as individual decision makers – as those in whose hands media control actually resides. From this perspective, media ownership does not necessarily determine medial control, because those who actually exercise the control, who make the relevant decisions, must be understood as having a culture and an agenda of their own, one not necessarily consonant with the interests of the owners.

Many studies of the actual functioning of complex, and especially bureaucratic, organizations suggest that the processes of evasion and circumvention that characterize the government can be expected to compromise any simple account of the exercise of corporate power. As Len Masterman points out in Teaching the Media:

We have to revise any simplistic notion we may have that commercial ownership of the media inevitably involves the cynical manipulation of audiences, that public service broadcasting is untainted by commercial considerations, or that media institutions necessarily exercise tight control over every aspect of their corporate enterprises. We have to recognise, as always, that the media are sites for struggle between conflicting interests, and that ownership/management power is not absolute, monolithic or uncontested. (Masterman, 1985: 74)

Furthermore, there are ways besides ownership in which interested parties, with money or political clout, can influence public policy or popular culture. Money can be used to support favored ideas and gain them recognition, and it can be used to elect candidates who will make decisions, or appoint judges who will make rulings, of a desired kind.

Transfection

II.B.2 Radio

Despite all policy efforts to enable a strong and vital private radio broadcasting industry in Austria, the ORF still dominated the market in 2001 (see Table IX). The radio division of ORF produces four radio channels serving distinct audiences. The local and regional channel Ö2 has the largest audience and reached an audience market share of some 39% in 2001. Second is the rock and pop channel Ö3, which is distributed nationwide, reaching a market share of 38%. The advertising-free classical music and information-oriented channel Ö1 came in third with some 5% of market share and FM4, a new international oriented channel, came in last with just 2% of the market.

Table IX. Radio Stations in Austria: 24-Hour Market Shares in % in 2001

Source: Steinmaurer, 2002, p. 44.

This market success leaves little room for the private sector. Since the early 1980s the Publishers' Association (Verband Österreichischer Zeitungen) intended to develop private radio as a new business field but failed to suggest a viable legal model to politics. Finally, in 1995, the first private regional radio channels started operations in Salzburg and Styria, followed by a bulk of 43 new channels all over Austria by April 1998. In each of the nine regions, one regional and a number of local operators were licensed with the local press publishers in almost all cases running the largest radio channel. The most successful of these channels reached some 15% of the regional market, but the large majority were unable to survive despite a generous advertising regulation allowing 172 minutes of advertising per day.

Economic constraints and political pressure resulted in a revision of the private radio law in 2001, allowing for private national radio chains on the one hand and more involvement of press publishers on the other. Consequently, the private radio landscape followed the well-known Austrian pattern of media concentration. Two groups managed to integrate radio operators on a national level. First, the Antenne Group operates the leading private radio stations in six federal Bundesländer. All of these stations are partly owned by a regional press baron but operate under the same brand heading. Second, Mediaprint started to build up a national chain branded as Krone Hitradio, referring to the dominating newspaper Neue Kronen-Zeitung. All these channels broadcast a rather similar mix of adult contemporary music formats and some information. In addition to these concentrated radio stations, a variety of smallish radio stations, mainly at the local level, complement Austria's radio landscape. Some of them consider themselves part of a third sector, noncommercial and nonprofit radio operators.

In 1984, in the first phase of commercial radios in Switzerland, about 30 licensed radio broadcasters went on the air, providing programs and services for their relatively small local audiences in all three linguistic regions. At the end of the century, approximately 45 commercial and some noncommercial stations were in operation. The market share of local radio rose to 35% (German speaking), 19% (French speaking), and 11% (Italian speaking), an indication that the stations from abroad are losing ground while the SRG SSR channels are still market leaders.

The SRG SSR broadcasts three radio programs in each of the three primary languages of the country. In addition it broadcasts approximately 12 hours daily in Romansh on FM. The three respective target channels contain each a “majority program,” a “culture program,” and an “accompanying program” for the younger, urban population.

In 2001 SRG SSR gave 71% of all airtime (some 120,000 hours per year) to music, 11% to news and current affairs, 11% to entertainment through the spoken word, and almost 6% to culture through the spoken word. SR DRS1, the most popular radio channel in Switzerland, broadcast 60% light music, 15% classic music, and 14% current news. Almost 7% went to culture through the spoken word (see Table X).

Table X. Radio Stations in Switzerland: Market Shares in % in 2001

Source: Geschäftbericht SRG SSR, 2002.

Because of the small size of the markets in both countries the income of the commercial operators is modest overall, but there are very wide variables according to the size and economic value of their respective transmission areas. For this reason, according to Swiss Radio and Television Law, local and regional operators may receive a contribution from the license fees (fee-splitting) if there are “no adequate financing prospects available” in their area and insofar as “there is a particular public interest in their programs”. Currently around two-thirds of all radio stations financed through advertising receive such adjustment payments, which can make up to a third of their annual income. A prerequisite is, however, documented proof that they suffer financial loss and achieve the required program performance.

I.A Media Growth and Concentration

Profound technological change has brought about new strategies in the expansion of the broadcast and print media. Currently, there is a trend toward convergence in multimedia alliances aimed at maximizing audience and incorporating younger audiences. Spain's gradual consolidation in the international economy has led to a significant expansion, with media investments in other European countries and in Latin American markets.

The process of international penetration into the Spanish media market began during the late 1980s (e.g., Fininvest, Canal+, Kirch, Mediaset, Rizzoli, Pearson), although other corporations had already invested in it (notably Hachette, Bertelsmann, and Axel Springer). Alliances with Spanish media groups have resulted in an increasing degree of media concentration. The causes of this concentration are found in the weak condition of the national industry at the time, which encouraged outside intervention from international groups and the prospect of a quick return on investment. It also stems partly from a reluctance of Spanish investors to take risks in this field. This trend has led to the consolidation of large multimedia groups, undertaking joint ventures in the press, broadcasting, and multimedia.

Since the early 1990s, three multimedia groups have dominated the Spanish media landscape: Prisa, Correo, and Zeta. These companies emerged as leading publishers in the press sector, and they gradually became involved in broadcasting and other media activities. As Table I shows, these groups have achieved increasing profits and consolidated their dominant position.

Table I. Business of Spanish Press Groups: 1996–1997 (in million pesetas)

Source: Companies' annual reports.

The Prisa group was established in 1976 with the launching of the reference newspaper El País, which reportedly was inspired by the New York Times. Prisa expanded rapidly. It also owns the sports daily As, the business newspaper Cinco Días, the SER radio network (which enjoys the highest ratings), and 25% of the subscription network Canal Plus. It is the main shareholder of the digital platform Canal Satélite Digital, which began broadcasting in January 1997. Prisa's strategy focuses on developing its local TV, digital, and satellite broadcasting ventures as well as consolidating its press and radio companies.

The Correo group grew during the 1980s out of the Basque El Correo Español-El Pueblo Vasco, a family-owned newspaper founded in 1910. In 1984, the owners created the company Comecosa, which acquired 12 regional newspapers and the leading weekend newsmagazine supplement El Semanal. The Correo group has instilled a strong professional culture and is highly profit oriented. In 1998, it reached a 15% share in the newspaper market. The group is also one of the main shareholders (25%) in the private network Tele 5, in the television news agency Atlas, and in several television production companies.

The Zeta group was founded in 1976 by the publisher Antonio Asensio, with the launching of the magazine Interviú. It currently owns 8 regional newspapers, 1 Catalonian sports newspaper, and 10 weekly periodicals. Since 1997, it has also developed multimedia publishing with its Zeta Multimedia division. In April 1999, the group launched a private radio network in Catalonia.

In 1998, the most significant change was the emergence of a strong multimedia group led by the telecommunications operator, Telefónica, linked in ways to the Spanish conservative government. Since its privatization in 1997, Telefónica has invested in the digital platform Via Digital (it holds 68% of the company), the private network Antena 3 TV, and the business media group Recoletos. In May 1999, Telefónica acquired the private radio network Onda Cero. Over the last few years, Telefónica has become a global communications company, comprised of 92,000 employees and a yearly cash flow of nearly 1 billion pesetas. It has developed strategic alliances in programming and technology (e.g., cable TV, digital TV, multimedia), allowing it to reach an immediate leading position in the Spanish media market and a key presence in Latin America. Telefonica's dominance reflects a significant change from the previous situation.

As a consequence of the market-determined indicators, press advertising expenditure is still larger than television advertising expenditure. Table II illustrates the trend in advertising expenditure from 1990 to 1997. Since 1993, advertising expenditure underwent a slow decline, which was reversed in 1997, showing a total real term growth of 4.2%. Growth was expected to be smaller in 1999, as the economy started to slow. According to Infoadex, most media are forecast to increase at around the total growth rate of 3.5%, although television is likely to grow more quickly than the total market rate. The most recent data on media audiences at the time of this writing are shown in Table III. All sectors experienced minimal growth except newspapers and magazines, which lost nearly 1% of their readers during the last 6 months for which data are available.

Table II. Advertising Expenditure in Spain (in million U.S. dollars)

Source: Repress/Nielsen (1991–1992) and Infoadex (1993).

Table III. Media Audience in Spain (in thousands)

Source: Estudio General de Medios (EGM).