What percentage of naval tonnage did the united states destroy under the london naval treaty?

By Lieutenant H. H. Smith-Hutton, U. S. Navy

“Omnia Mutantur et Nos Mutamur”

The history of attempts to regulate and standardize the navies of the world powers by mutual agreement's not an encouraging one. At the present time it is difficult to foresee the ultimate effects of the virtual abandonment of the Promising beginning made at Washington 15 years ago. It is certain that they will be serious. It is possible that they will be tragic. Does the refusal to renew the Wash­ington and London treaties mean that the ideals for which those treaties stood have gone forever? Is the failure to agree to limit the sizes of the world’s fleets an indi­cation that distrust, suspicion, ill-will, and opposition will govern international rela­tionships permanently? Does it mean that in the future the policies of the states of the world necessarily will be framed in in­tense nationalism? Does it mean that the nations are committed to preparing for war instead of for peace?

For 10 years after the World War of 1914-18 the efforts of the peoples of the world and of their leaders were largely divided between the great tasks of re­pairing the damages of that war and of seeking to find devices for preserving world peace. The desire for permanent peace was as universal as the desire to effect col­lective security as the only possible alter­native to complete international anarchy. There was a feeling that another war would destroy everything that mankind had been taught to value and that pres­ent-day civilization could not stand the strain of a recurrence of that devastating struggle. It was common belief that every­thing possible must be done to prevent another war and, in order to achieve some measure of collective security, agree­ments renouncing war were signed, pacts of mutual guarantee were ratified, and programs for gradual disarmament were sponsored by the leading nations of the world. This gradual disarmament was a most important undertaking; in fact it was made a section of the treaty of peace which brought to a close the greatest war in world history. This treaty pledged even the nations victorious in that war to a sys­tematic scaling down of their armaments.

That spirit no longer prevails. The re­sults of more than a decade of effort and negotiations are almost nothing. Today, in some respects, the situation is worse than in 1914. The world is divided into armed groups, armies and navies are being in­creased by every nation, and intense nationalism which refuses to be bound by international pacts to prevent future wars, to guarantee security to any other state, to reduce armaments, or to limit the size of navies, is more in evidence than the desire to work for peace. The world powers are without exception devoting themselves to the expensive task of “defensive rearma­ment,” preparing for a war which is ex­pected to break out at any moment. They are doing this in spite of the heavy costs of these programs and in spite of the fact that all of them have unbalanced budgets. On the surface it would appear to be the height of futility to prepare for war in this deliberate fashion. Why are these prepa­rations necessary? What is the danger and where does it lie? The answer is that cer­tain nations are preparing with all of the forces at their command for the next war which they are deliberately planning. Other nations, fearing to allow the horrors of a war to involve their own peoples and believing that the only way to prevent it is by meeting force with force, are building up their fleets and their armies in great haste and at great sacrifice. Not only is there a grave possibility of a naval race, but of the most serious consequences of such a race. Extensive naval construction and costly military preparations do not cause war, but they do indicate the trend of the times, and the problems involved are much more fundamental than the naval problem. When they are solved, the naval problem also will be capable of solution.

It is axiomatic that armies and navies are the result of national policy. They are instruments designed, built up, and main­tained for the purpose of carrying out national policies. Thus, in order to get a clear understanding of the present naval situation and to decide whether a solution of the naval problem is possible under present world conditions, it is necessary to examine the world political situation. The naval problem cannot be disentangled from that political situation and it follows that if it has been impossible for the na­tions to reach an agreement in regard to their navies, the real differences lie in con­flicts of national aims. First, however, a survey of the attempts to limit navies and a discussion of the naval treaties which have been formulated in the past are necessary.

Of the devices sought to preserve world peace and to stabilize world conditions the one that appeared to hold the greatest promise of success was the plan to limit the sizes of the navies of the world. If the powers were sincere in their efforts toward preserving peace and if they were willing to indicate in a practical way their an­nounced intention of renouncing “war as an instrument of national policy,” mutual agreements to limit the sizes of their respec­tive navies to the lowest limits compatible with the preservation of a reasonable se­curity could be entered into without any fear of jeopardizing national interests. Not only would such agreements dispel inter­national misgivings and distrust and give to other nations concrete evidence of mu­tual peaceful intentions, but they would enable all the nations concerned to divert for more productive purposes the funds which would otherwise be spent for main­taining large fleets. Such naval pacts must have as a basis a real desire to respect the political, economic, and commercial rights and interests of other nations. At one time there appeared to be that basis, as well as a real desire to keep the peace.

The initial step in the direction of naval armament limitations was made in 1921-22, three years after the World War. At Washington the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy met to frame the first general treaty to limit the sizes of their navies. This conference was a success in that ratios of tonnages for capital ships and aircraft carriers were established (the famous formula of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 for the ratio of the capital ships of navies of those powers was fixed). It is noteworthy that this was the first time in history that the powers could agree on a definite naval ratio regarding each other. The other salient features of this important naval treaty were:

(a) It was to remain in force until December 31, 1936, subject to the withdrawal of any signatory on two years’ notice.

(b) The status quo as regards outlying naval bases and fortifications was to be maintained in the Pacific, west of Hawaii and north of Hong-Kong.

(c) Capital ships were defined as to tonnage and armament, and a definite schedule of their replacement was established.

(d) The total tonnages for the capital ships of c signatory powers were fixed.

(e) Aircraft carriers were defined as to tonnage and armament.

(f) The total tonnages for aircraft carriers of the signatory powers were fixed.

(g) The maximum armament to be used on merchant ships was established, since these vessels could be fitted to mount guns limited to 6 inches.

This treaty was hailed throughout the world as a great success, and in reality it was an excellent beginning in spite of the fact that no agreement could be reached on the total or the individual ship tonnages of cruisers, destroyers, and sub­marines, and that the treaty regulating submarine warfare was not ratified by all of the signatories. However, these vessels were limited to 10,000 tons and to 8-inch guns. In the United States in particular the feeling was that the Washington treaty settled the naval problem for all time. It was realized that America had made considerable sacrifices by scrapping many vessels almost completed and aban­doning a building program which would have made her the world’s strongest naval power, but it was also the general feeling that this sacrifice was for the good of the world, and that the United States had again set an example for other nations to follow.

It is important to note in connection with the Washington treaty that problems even more far reaching than the purely naval problem were considered and ad­justed. The delegates realized that it was impossible to solve the naval problem apart from international politics, and other treaties, concerned not with navies but with the prevention of disputes af­fecting the Pacific area and the Asiatic mainland, were debated, drawn up, and later ratified. These treaties, namely the Four-Power Treaty and the Nine-Power Treaty, were designed to stabilize the world political situation and to maintain equality of opportunity in China by guar­anteeing China’s political integrity and the “Open Door.” They served to cement the terms of the naval pact and even to make its final ratification possible. With­out them it is difficult to believe that the latter could have been formulated.

In the years following the ratification of the Washington treaty various attempts were made at the General Disarmament Conference held under the auspices of the League of Nations to continue the work begun at Washington, since it was recog­nized that with no limitation on cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, the naval problem was only partly solved. There was also a fear that the spirit behind the Wash­ington treaty was weakening. All of the signatories observed the terms of the treaty to the letter, but with the exception of the United States all began extensive programs of warship construction in those types which were not limited by the treaty. Not only were later conferences at Geneva not successful, but they brought out, emphasized, and defined the differ­ences in naval policies, naval needs, and naval opinion that existed among the nations. Not only was there no progress toward the desired goal of more complete limitations, but the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan became involved in highly technical discussions concerning tonnages and armaments of ships of the various categories. Questions of the purely naval needs of the various countries and not of the policies masked by those needs were discussed (not with the idea that the navies of the powers would never be needed but with the idea that each country must be sure that it would not be placed at a disadvantage in the next war). Each nation maintained that her needs were wholly defensive and that her naval preparations were purely defensive in character, but no agreement even on such “defensive fleets” could be reached.

By the terms of the Washington treaty a conference in revision was to be held after 8 years had passed, and the second important naval conference opened in London in 1930. At this conference, which was also largely technical in character, strong efforts were made to extend the ratio provisions of the Washington treaty regarding capital ships and aircraft carriers to include smaller naval craft. These ef­forts were only partially successful. Both France and Italy refused to agree to any proposal whereby the celebrated ratio would be made to include vessels which they considered essential for their national security. France would not concede the right of Italy to parity with her in the cruiser, destroyer, and submarine cate­gories, and Italy would accept nothing less than parity. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan did, however, agree, and for the first time in history there were both qualitative and quantitative limita­tions on all classes of ships. At the strong insistence of Japan’s delegation, the Japanese ratios in the smaller vessels were made slightly higher than the ratios deter­mined at Washington 8 years before. While the London treaty was thus limited to three signatories and could be called at best only a partial success, it did, in addi­tion to limiting the three classes of ships not limited previously:

1. Extend the capital shipbuilding holiday to 1936 by delaying the schedule of replacements called for by the Washington treaty.
2. Reduce the number of capital ships of the United States and Great Britain from 18 to 15 and of Japan from 10 to 9.
3. Limit the sizes of submarines.
4. Define age limits for all classes of ships.

Thus in spite of the refusal of Italy and France to join the other powers, the Lon­don treaty did serve to fix the sizes and ratios of the three most powerful navies.

The third important naval conference to consider a treaty to replace the Wash­ington and London treaties also opened in London, 5 years after the first London treaty was signed. Prior to that time, how­ever, certain events of far-reaching im­portance had taken place. These events showed clearly that the naval question was not capable of being solved apart from the political question and that the splendid beginning made at Washington could not last.

The first evidences of dissatisfaction with the ratio principle already estab­lished for 10 years came from Japan. The Japanese had ratified both naval treaties and had observed them faithfully. The Japanese government during that period was motivated by a desire to maintain cordial relations with all of the powers sig­natory to the Washington treaties. Never­theless, certain factions in Japan, notably the Japanese Navy, were violently op­posed to the ratification of the London treaty of 1930. At that time these factions were not powerful enough to dictate governmental policy and the treaty was ratified in spite of their strong opposition. However the feeling that Japan’s security was menaced and that her international prestige was lowered by agreeing to a 5:3 ratio persisted and after 1931 grew very rapidly. The dissatisfaction with the naval treaties became so strong by 1934 that the government was forced, in deference to national opinion guided by the Navy, to abrogate the Washington treaty of 1922. During this same period of 1931-34 great changes also took place in Japan’s politi­cal, military, and naval policies. In those years Japan’s policy, instead of being one of working in close harmony with other powers, was one which brought her into violent controversy with all of them. This policy, which is definitely imperialistic and which involves expansion by armed force on the Asiatic mainland, resulted in her leaving the League of Nations, abrogating the Washington treaty, and finally with­drawing from the 1936 London conference. During this time, she was building up her national forces, naval and military, as much as her national resources would per­mit, and the whole Japanese nation was very sensitive on questions of national honor and on the subject of naval limita­tions. For her this was an “emergency Period” and she made it so for the rest of the world, because her dissatisfaction with the ratio principle, and her notification to the United States that after December 31, 1936, she would not be bound by the terms of the Washington treaty, made the prospects of success of any future naval conference very slight.

In accordance with one of the provisions of the Washington treaty, a conference was to be called within one year following its abrogation by a signatory power. Pre­liminary conversations indicated that in all probability no great success could be expected; in fact it was almost a certainty that a compromise which would meet the approval of all of the powers could not be evolved. Early in the conference, which opened in London in December, 1935, the impossibility of reaching an agreement if Japan were to be included was clearly apparent, and when Japan perceived that her proposal for a common upper limit and her claim to parity were sure to be denied, she instructed her delegates to withdraw from the conference. After several months of negotiations the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and France did reach an agreement and the treaty known as the 1936 London Naval Treaty came into being. This treaty is considered in considerable detail: (1) because it is the treaty which is in force between the two greatest naval powers and (2) because its terms are being used by Great Britain as a model for naval pacts in negotiations with Soviet Russia, Germany, and Poland. In general its provisions are as follows:

(?) The treaty will remain in force from Janu­ary 1, 1937 until December 31, 1942.

(b) Signatory powers must during the first 4 months of each year give notice to the other sig­natories of their building programs for the follow­ing year. Detailed information concerning the important characteristics of the proposed con­struction and details of modernization must also be furnished other signatories.

(c) Capital ships are divided into two cate­gories. No capital ship will be larger than 35,000 tons or carry guns larger than 16 inches (14 inches if Japan agrees before April 1, 1937). No capital ships of less than 17,500 tons or with guns less than 10 inches will be built. The age limit of capi­tal ships is fixed at 26 years.

(d) Aircraft carriers are defined as vessels for carrying or operating aircraft at sea and are di­vided into ships with flight decks and ships with­out flight decks. Carriers are limited to 23,000 tons and to 6.1-inch guns. The age limit of carriers is fixed at 20 years.

(e) Light surface craft are defined as vessels over 100 tons and not over 10,000 tons which are not carriers, minor war vessels, or auxiliary ves­sels. They are divided into three classes: (1) With guns between 6.1 and 8 inches. (2) No guns over 6.1 inches and larger than 3,000 tons. (3) No guns over 6.1 inches and less than 3,000 tons. No light surface vessels of more than 8,000 tons will be constructed during the period the treaty is in force. The age limits of light surface craft vary between 16 and 20 years.

(f) No submarines over 2,000 tons or with guns larger than 5.1 inches will be constructed. The age limit of submarines is 13 years.

(g) Minor war vessels, auxiliary vessels, small craft, and merchant ships are defined and classified

The 1936 London treaty has no pro­visions in regard to quantitative limita­tions, but it is obviously better than no treaty at all since it accomplishes several important ends: (1) It standardizes and classifies the types of warships into definite groups, and the individual ship tonnages as fixed in the Washington and London treaties are in general continued. This pre­vents, among the signatory powers at least, the development and construction of an entirely new type of ship which might make existing types obsolete or obsolescent. For example, it will be noted that vessels between 8,000 and 17,500 tons cannot be constructed during the next six years, which should be a stabilizing factor. (2) The principle of exchanging informa­tion concerning building programs and modernization programs is most impor­tant. This clause prevents the construction of ships in secret and it should do much to promote a free exchange of information, not only concerning the fleets, but the national policies as reflected in the naval policies of the signatory powers. This ex­change of information will at least prevent any secret offensive types from making a sudden appearance on the seas. Also a naval race among the signatory powers is made much less likely by this provision, since eight months must elapse between the notification of the intention to con­struct a vessel and its actual laying down.

However, the 1936 London naval treaty cannot be called an effective limitations pact since it does not fix the numbers of ships of each category that each signatory can build, and does not include among the nations bound by the treaty such impor­tant naval powers as Japan, Soviet Russia, Italy, and Germany. Any of these coun­tries can, by constructing vessels which do not conform to the treaty, nullify its provisions because in that event the signatory powers are released from the limitations on displacement and armament. Japan has already stated formally that she will not adhere to the terms of the treaty and that refusal does nullify the important pro­vision in regard to the limit of 14 inches for the guns of capital ships. Whether she will go further in her policy of noncon­formance is not clear at the present time, but she may, by building vessels outside the treaty limits, make it necessary for other powers to match her construction. In this respect the inadequacy of the treaty is apparent, and in order to clear the situation thus brought about in Europe, Great Britain, who is vitally con­cerned by the fact that her powerful neighbors, Soviet Russia and Germany, were not bound by the treaty, has made efforts to include qualitative agreements with those countries. It had been the in­tention to include them in the original dis­cussions which opened in December, 1935, but Germany was not asked because of opposition by France, and Soviet Russia was not asked to take part in the confer­ence because of opposition by Japan. These negotiations with Russia and Ger­many have been in a large measure a success. Germany has agreed to the quali­tative limitations of the treaty and has further agreed to limit the size of her fleet to 35 per cent of that of Great Britain. Soviet Russia has also agreed to limit her fleet in European waters to conform to the same standard, except for slight modifica­tions in cruiser armament. The conclusion of these two pacts depended on each other in that both Soviet Russia and Germany have refused to be bound unless the other nation also becomes signatory to a similar treaty. These bilateral treaties tend to stabilize the naval situation in Europe to some extent, for now with the one excep­tion of Italy, all of the important naval powers have bound themselves to a quali­tative limitation and have agreed to notify Great Britain of their future building pro­grams. Italy’s intentions are not clear at the present time, but at London the Italian delegation appeared to agree in principle with the terms of the treaty as finally drafted. She refused to sign it be­cause at that time she was involved in a dangerous dispute with Great Britain, France, and the League of Nations in re­gard to Ethiopia. Thus the inclusion of Italy at this time is questionable, although her ultimate ratification of the treaty or a similar treaty is not an impossibility.

Unfortunately neither the 1936 London treaty nor the bilateral pacts outlined do away with the grave possibilities of a naval race among the powers. In fact a study of the present building programs leads to the conclusion that in spite of the notifica­tion clauses such a race is already in prog­ress. The following figures are those of January 1, 1937, and are thus only approx­imately correct since each month brings reports of additions to the announced building programs. They do, however, show that there are at the present time more ships under construction than ever before in world history, with the exception of that period from 1914 to 1918 when the world was at war.

Vessels under Construction, or Appropriated for, January 1, 1937, by Six Principal Naval Powers

Future plans in addition to these vessels include possible additional capital ship construction by Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, as well as more cruisers, destroyers, and submarines by all of the nations.

This situation appears to be worse than that which obtained in 1921 before the first conference to limit navies was held. Certainly the nations are not cutting down on the sizes of their fleets at the present time and there does not appear to be much room for optimism in regard to the future, because of the apparently irreconcilable divergence of views between Japan on the one hand and Soviet Russia, Great Britain, and the United States on the other; as well as between France on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other. A similar lack of accord exists be­tween Germany and Soviet Russia. What will this situation lead to after December, 1936, when every nation in the world ex­cept Germany (which is bound by a quan­titative agreement with Great Britain) will be free to build as many ships as her budget will allow? The question is not who will start a naval race, but where will the present race lead and what will be the ending?

One important and at the same time alarming result of the recent wholesale building by all of the powers has been that even the quantitative limitations of the 1930 London treaty could not be observed by all of the signatories for the duration of that treaty. Great Britain in a recent com­munication to the United States and Japan invoked the escalator clause of the treaty to escape scrapping 40,000 tons of destroyers. In taking this step, which is in a sense an economical one since it permits her to retain vessels which are still useful but nevertheless involves an ultimate in­crease in the world’s fleets, Great Britain points out that non-signatory powers (that is France, Italy, Germany, and Soviet Russia) have built more than 200 submarines since 1930. As a result both the United States and Japan have the right to make a proportionate increase in the total tonnage of the same category. The United States has served notification that she too will retain some of her excess destroyer tonnage and Japan is retaining not only destroyers but submarines as well. Not only are the naval issues beclouded and the cause of considerable international antagonism and irritation, but the mutual suspicion existing between the nations is shown by the attitude in regard to the Pacific fortification problem. Now that the Washington treaty is a thing of the past, this important problem remains to be solved, and it appears that the solution will involve competition in Pacific fortification construction in addition to that already in progress in naval building. Great Britain has approached the United States and Japan on this point which involves the entire Pacific from Alaska to Singapore. It is impossible to say what the final de­cisions will be, but Japan’s policy of isola­tion will probably place practical diffi­culties in the way by refusing to concur in renewing the non-fortification section of the Washington treaty. In this connection the United States takes the view that as long as Japan intends to increase her fleet above the Washington and London ratios, no agreement in regard to Pacific fortifica­tions is possible. Truly something has happened to change the world political situation since 1921 when the American Secretary of State made his historic speech setting forth the arms limitation proposal of the United States and all of the nations agreed to the maintenance of the status quo in the important Pacific area. What has caused the situation to deteriorate to the present one of irritation and suspicion? Why is it any more impossible to agree on policies and on quantitative and qualita­tive naval limitations now than it was in 1921? The answers to these questions are clear when the foreign policies of the various countries are examined.

The political situation in Europe is the most difficult, the most complex, and withal the most dangerous because of the number, proximity, and the strength of the nations involved. Here are located the great powers—Great Britain, France, Soviet Russia, Germany, and Italy. In spite of the League of Nations, Locarno treaties, and Kellogg peace pacts these nations are not always governed, in their relations, entirely by a spirit of close har­mony. On the contrary they are at times not only mutually antagonistic but defi­nitely hostile. The dangerous potentialities of the political situation directly influence the naval problem since any change in the former affects the naval construction pro­gram, and new construction by any one country depends largely on that of her prob­able enemy and must be built for the pur­pose of offsetting and counterbalancing the types of ships favored by those probable enemy countries. Even this is very diffi­cult, because who can say, in the light of the present complex situation, who the probable enemy of tomorrow will be? A striking example of this is the recent lack of cordiality between Great Britain and Italy, two countries which have been allies and friends for years.

Great Britain, controlling as she does the most widespread and extensive empire in the world, desires above all to hold that empire intact. Also as one of the greatest industrial and commercial nations she desires that the peace of the world be pre­served so that her factories and her trade can continue to flourish. Conservative Great Britain is one of the firmest expo­nents of the maintenance of the status quo. Politically it has been her traditional policy to oppose the strongest power on the continent of Europe in order to keep any great power from controlling Belgium and Holland which confront her on the mainland. To do this she has supported or allied herself with the nation or group of nations which oppose the rise of any power to such strength as to dominate the con­tinent of Europe completely. Since Great Britain has no land frontier, and since she is to a great extent dependent on her sea communications for her supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs, the maintenance of the world’s strongest fleet has been for many decades the corner stone of her policy. The control of the sea communica­tions with India, Australia, and the Far East is vital to her if she is to hold her empire together. Because of the problems of protecting these sea lanes, Great Britain is vitally interested in the size and composition of the fleets of France, Italy, and Germany, for France and Italy flank the important routes through the Mediter­ranean, and Germany threatens the routes leading through the seas surrounding the British Isles. As in all other international matters, Great Britain desires to maintain the status quo as regards navies. The re­appearance of a strong German Navy in the North Sea and Italy’s increasing strength in the Mediterranean are both Potential menaces that Great Britain can­not ignore. She has solved the first by fixing the size of the German fleet in rela­tion to her own, and is preparing to solve the second by strengthening the alternate route around Africa, and at the same time making important additions to her fleet. Great Britain’s position vis-a-vis France is easier, since in general they are in accord on political questions and neither covets the possessions of the other. Great Britain does, however, view with alarm the build­ing up of the French Navy to its pre-war strength, particularly as regards sub­marines. Nor can Britain completely ignore the possible threats of the United States Fleet and the Japanese Fleet, though neither of these constitute an immediate menace as do the German and Italian navies. At the present time the United States and Great Britain are in close accord on naval questions; the minor divergences of views in regard to battle­ship and cruiser tonnages and armament having been shelved. There have been evi­dences that some British authorities are not entirely reconciled to recognizing formally the right of the United States to parity, and that an arrangement more to the advantage of Great Britain would be preferred by them, but fortunately this feeling (probably based on a belief that the changed European situation has ren­dered America’s claim to parity obsolete) has not been stressed to the point of mar­ring the good understanding between the two countries. The British recognize that the United States, which is one of the most powerful of nations, has the ability and the resources to maintain her fleet on a level with any in the world. The position of Great Britain as opposed to her former ally, Japan, is not as happy as it once was. Japan has as recently as the spring of 1936 made a determined effort to gain parity with her, and in spite of an evident desire to include Japan in the agreement and to reach some kind of compromise acceptable to both nations, Great Britain is not yet prepared to accept that claim. To do so would be the same as granting Japan com­plete control of the Western Pacific where Great Britain has important, almost vital, interests. While recent Japanese action can only be interpreted as an attempt to gain complete hegemony of Eastern Asia, this does not constitute a direct menace to British interests in India, the Malay Pen­insula, Australia, and New Zealand. Therefore no immediate action is neces­sary because England will probably not be inclined to do more than prevent a direct attack on these territories, but at the same time she is probably unwilling to entrust the safety of these areas, vital to her empire, entirely to the good will of another power.

Great Britain favors a reduction of fleets, if it is done in accordance with the present ratio, as well as a reduction of the tonnages of surface craft and the total abolition of submarines. Failing in these she will maintain a fleet which is approxi­mately as strong as that of any two Euro­pean powers combined, which is as large as the United States Fleet, and which has a fair margin of superiority over the Japa­nese Navy. At the same time, Great Britain is ever ready to enter into con­versations in regard to naval problems, and to continue to play an important part in advancing the cause of naval limita­tions. She desires particularly to arrive at qualitative agreements with other powers in order to prevent important parts of her fleet from being made obsolete by the con­struction of new types of vessels by other powers.

France is another nation which desires to be left in peace to enjoy her wealth and her prosperity. France’s ever present con­cern is for her security and for the security of her colonial empire in Africa. She wants to be assured of her strong position on the Continent, her influential position in world affairs, and the safety of her colonies, but her position between two aggressive and dissatisfied nations is not without its diffi­culties. France’s rivalry with Germany for the control of middle Europe is one of long standing, one which has caused several bitter and bloody wars, and one which even now is not unmixed with mutual suspicion, fear, and hatred. France has endeavored by every means at her com­mand to prevent Germany from regaining her former position of economic and mili­tary strength because she has feared that Germany would attempt to recapture the territory lost during the World War, that Germany was seeking revenge, and that another war with her was only a question of time. For these reasons France’s expend­itures for her army, navy, and- air force have been as large as she could afford and at the same time she has refused to recog­nize Germany’s right to either a modern army or a large navy. In the last two years, in spite of treaty restrictions, Ger­many has returned to the naval picture and France notes with alarm that her Atlantic coast ports are again threatened by a German fleet, and that Germany is specializing in light, fast battleships and submarines which would be the types of ships most suitable for use against the French merchant marine. In a similar manner the Italian Fleet in the Mediter­ranean presents a difficult problem for France, since the safety of her African colonies and to some extent France herself depends on the maintenance of her lines of communications in the western part of the Mediterranean. France has refused to even consider Italy’s claim to parity with her, but since her most important defense lines are on land she would be willing to reduce her fleet if Italy and Germany were to make proportionate reductions. How­ever, with extensive building by both of these powers, France will find it increas­ingly difficult to maintain even a slight margin over the navies of these two countries, in spite of her determination to do so if her resources will permit.

Soviet Russia is the third state of Europe which desires to maintain the status quo in world affairs. Russia desires peace because she does not need more territory, she is not over-populated, she has raw materials in abundance, and her industries cannot yet supply her domestic needs. Soviet Russia’s greatest desire is to be left to devote herself to internal de­velopment. For political reasons her rela­tions with her neighbors in Europe and Asia have not been entirely cordial, and she has feared that certain sections of her vast territory are coveted by other coun­tries, so she has made tremendous in­creases in her armaments in order to resist any such encroachments. Russia, like France, is faced with two strong aggressive powers, Germany on the west and Japan on the east, and she has feared that these nations, possibly acting as allies, have plans to attack her. Soviet Russia’s pri­mary concern is with her army and her air force, and she has developed these until they are numerically as strong as those of any nation in the world. Particularly as regards her air force she has adopted a two-power standard; that is, she proposes a force as strong as the combined air fleets of Japan and Germany. While she has announced no such ambitious program as regards her navy, she has refused to limit in any way her fleet in Far Eastern waters, in view of the lack of limitations placed on the Japanese Fleet, which she greatly fears. In her recent agreement with Great Britain she has, however, undertaken not to build vessels outside the limits of the 1936 London treaty unless Japan does so, and she has further agreed not to transfer any vessels exceeding the limits of that treaty from the Far East to the Black Sea or to Europe. In Europe, Soviet Russia has declined to be bound by any pact which did not also bind Germany, but in view of the Anglo-German treaty signed recently, she has committed herself to practically the same limitations. It is understood that the minor differences between the two agreements are that Soviet Russia is allowed the right to build 7 cruisers mounting 7.1-inch guns instead of the 6.1-inch limit of the treaty. Russia id also exchange information on naval adding programs except as regards her forces in Asiatic waters. The importance of is pact is understood when it is realized that without it the Anglo-German treaty would have been impossible, and thus the Soviet Navy, which is still much inferior to the navies of Japan and Germany, has a ready begun to make itself felt in world affairs. The problems of the relations be­tween Soviet Russia and Japan, both as regards their navies and their relations in general, are still unsolved and are poten­tially most dangerous.

Germany’s position in Europe differs considerably from that of her neighbors, Great Britain, France, and Soviet Russia. Defeated in the World War, compelled to surrender important parts of her former territory, forced to give up her colonies in Africa and in the Pacific, and obliged to pay large sums for reparations, Germany feels that her present economic and politi­cal position is intolerable. Worse than that, the Germans have convinced themselves that the future, in the light of the present situation, holds nothing and that Germany must change her condition by some means, peaceful if possible, if not by going to war. For almost 15 years, in the face of superior force, she did not rebel openly, but that attitude has been changed. Ger­man leaders have served notice on the world that they intend to take what they need to keep up the German standard of living; that is, they are determined to seize by force, if there is no other way, the necessary sources of raw materials. That Germany is preparing for a war to the exclusion of everything else is shown by the fact that, although the country suffers from a shortage of foodstuffs, more than $4,000,000,000 was spent last year on the army, navy, and air force. These efforts are directed against her ancient enemies France and Soviet Russia, and it is for use against these two countries that Germany is preparing her fleet. For the present she has agreed to limit her navy to 35 per cent of that of the British Fleet, which allows her to build all that she can afford at present, especially as Britain is making important additions to her navy, but whether this attitude will continue when she has improved her economic posi­tion is open to question.

Italy is the second nation in Europe that desires a change in the existing world conditions. Her present dream, which if possible she will make into reality, is to reconstruct the old Roman Empire, domi­nate the Mediterranean and turn it into an Italian lake, and to expand so that her excess population can be taken care of. Not only that, because in addition she needs raw materials for her factories and colonies so that she can sell her goods. The temper and the determination of the Italian government and people to bring this about in the face of grave dangers is shown by recent Italian action in Ethio­pia. As regards her navy, Italy will no doubt agree to the qualitative limits of the 1936 London treaty, for her needs do not extend beyond the Mediterranean, but at the same time she will endeavor to keep pace with France. Her position as opposed to France is somewhat easier since Ger­many began to rebuild her fleet, because France has felt compelled to transfer some of her attention to the English Channel area. Nevertheless parity with France is Italy’s goal and she will not rest until that goal is reached.

Japan’s position in Asia resembles, in some respects, that of Germany and Italy in Europe. She too is over-populated, has few minerals, and is to a large extent dependent on foreign raw materials and foreign markets. Japan is determined, in the same way that Germany and Italy are, to solve her economic difficulties by force if necessary, and in this she is even more fortunately situated than these two coun­tries. She has a near neighbor who is still comparatively weak and who has many of the minerals, raw materials, and other re­sources that Japan needs. Japan has, in the last few years, taken by force the north­eastern section of this neighbor, and has created a state dependent on her, and now she proposes to extend her economic con­trol into North China if possible. In recent months another policy of advance to the southward in the direction of the Philip­pines and the Dutch East Indies has been formulated by her leaders, who give as­surances that this also is merely an eco­nomic step. However the change from an economic dominance to a political domi­nance is only a small one and will be easy to make if the time comes. A complete and unchallenged hegemony in Asia is Japan’s goal, and her political, military, and com­mercial policies will be continued in the same aggressive way until some solution of her problems is reached. For good or bad, Japan has stated that she will not agree to any naval treaty which does not give her parity with the United States and Great Britain. She feels that she is entitled to absolute equality in principle, although she has stated that her naval needs do not involve the exact duplication of the fleets of the other two powers. Her naval prob­lem, which involves the defense of her position in the Western Pacific, calls for numerous submarines and aircraft, and Japanese future naval construction will, no doubt, be concentrated on these types.

The United States, being in a singularly fortunate position geographically and eco­nomically, favors the maintenance of the status quo in world affairs. She has tried to set an example as a peace-loving state by adopting officially the policy of the good neighbor toward all nations. The United States has no desire to become in­volved in a war with any nation, but on the contrary she desires to assist in every way possible the prevention of war. Unless the United States is threatened by an aggressive enemy, she does not even desire to become involved in another war as she was in the war of 1914-18. It is generally agreed in the United States that it is for the benefit of mankind that all nations live in peace, harmony, and good will, and to that end she has exerted every effort to encourage disarmament through example and through co-operation with other na­tions, and she has participated in all of the treaties designed to limit navies. Not only that, but a recent policy in regard to neutrality has been formulated in an at­tempt to insure that the United States will be neutral even though world peace is broken by other powers. This attempt consists in endeavoring to make sure that war will not be a source of profit for Americans, and that American citizens will not be able to make money out of wars in other parts of the world. The United States has tried to adopt and has adopted definite treaties regarding the manufac­ture and the international sale of arms, ammunition, and aircraft for military pur­poses, and in line with this policy she has given active support to plans to reduce the sizes of the world’s navies. If the status quo and the general ratios as laid down in the Washington and London treaties were maintained, the United States would agree to any reduction plan no matter how dras­tic. The United States government is, however, committed to maintaining a naval force second to none, even at the unwelcome possibility of engaging in an armament race. As regards Pacific fortifi­cations and bases the United States has indicated that her agreement to maintain the status quo was originally contingent on the Japanese accepting the 5:3 ratio, and hat if Japan exceeds her present fleet strength, the United States cannot agree to leave American bases in the Pacific area in their present condition.

This brief outline is sufficient to indicate the general division of the powers of the World into two classes. The first class, into which can be grouped the United States, threat Britain, France, and Soviet Russia, consists of countries having widespread territories or possessing great colonial em­pires, with vast resources of raw materials. These states desire nothing better than to have world conditions remain as they are and to be left in peace so that they can make the best use of their wealth. For these nations the deliberate preparation tor an aggressive war is unthinkable. Any military preparations which they may make is for the purpose of holding what they have already acquired. In the second group are powers who find themselves in a very different situation. These are the pow­ers which are over-populated, which have insufficient territory to maintain that pop­ulation in a standard of living which is acceptable to them, and which have only limited resources of raw materials. This group, which includes Germany, Italy, and Japan (together with Bulgaria, Austria, and Hungary, non-naval powers not con­sidered in this discussion), opposes a con­tinuance of the present state of world affairs. These three great countries do not believe that the solution of their problems and their future lies in maintaining peace with their neighbors. On the contrary their leaders have convinced them that this future will be intolerable unless they ex­pand and take by force the sources of raw materials which are necessary for their industries. They see no other alternative, and for this reason they do not consider that war is a foolish, unnecessary under­taking. They feel that their commercial, economic, and territorial ambitions are legitimate, that unless they expand they will starve, and that the ultimate costs of realizing their aims are less than the costs of keeping the peace. For these reasons the intensive preparations for war in Ger­many, Italy, and Japan are not only ma­terial but intellectual and moral.

This dissatisfaction with existing world conditions; this deep-seated belief by these three nations that the other world powers are actuated largely by a desire to curb their legitimate expansion; this feeling that, if they do not change the present dis­tribution of natural resources, they cannot keep their people at work, their factories running, and their ships on the sea, are the reasons behind the existing international distrust, suspicion, jealousy, and rivalry. Unfortunately the solution of these prob­lems is most difficult. What can be done even if it is understood and admitted that these powers are not entirely in the wrong, and that their difficulties arising from large populations in comparatively small and unproductive countries are gen­uine? The powers that have the territory seem unwilling to do anything about it, or at least they are not willing to allow the dissatisfied states to arrange the world as they choose. In the first place no one country or group of countries has the strength and authority necessary to place all of the nations of the world in the proper “economic category.” It is possible that an international committee might revise the economic boundaries and achieve a peace­ful adjustment of world territory, but it is not probable. Although wholly idealistic and impractical, it has been suggested that certain territories in the tropics be turned over to the League of Nations to be used as a common source of raw materials and as a common market, each nation keeping its share of the expenses. And yet if this is not practical, how else are the nations which are determined to expand to be placated? One of the admitted diffi­culties is what it will take to satisfy these dissatisfied states. For example, if recent changes in Africa and Asia leave Italy and Japan still dissatisfied—and if the statements of their leaders can be be­lieved they are still in that class—when will they take their places among the satisfied states? How much more do they feel they need?

There seem to be only two courses open to the countries which control the largest share of the world’s raw materials. They must be prepared to attempt to equalize the difference in natural wealth or be pre­pared to go to war to defend their own from the less-favored but determined and aggressive nations. Certainly proposals for further peace treaties are not the answer. In the past these treaties have been initi­ated by nations desirous of maintaining the status quo, but they do not better the desperate economic situations in which Germany, Italy, and Japan consider themselves. The solution of these eco­nomic problems and thus of the naval problems does not depend on new agree­ments to renounce war or additional pro­grams for disarmament, because they do not touch on the basic issues. When the world economic situation is equalized, if that is possible, there will be a lessening of the feeling of distrust among nations and the naval problem will be readily solved. However, until there has been some eco­nomic readjustment, or until all of the nations of the world become satisfied with their conditions, it is useless to expect naval conferences to succeed or fleets to be reduced. It is likewise useless to at­tempt to settle questions of relative se­curity, to become involved in technical discussions as to whether certain classes of warships are offensive or defensive types, or to debate problems of fleet strengths based on relative lengths of sea frontiers. These discussions are beside the point and are, in addition, merely another source of international irritation. In the meantime until the economic basis of the present feeling of distrust is changed, and until there is no danger that differences in policy and aims cannot be solved by peace­ful means, the United States, which is more fortunately situated than any other country in the world as regards wealth and economic self-sufficiency, would do well to take elementary precautions for the securing of her strategic areas.

Did the US break the Washington Naval Treaty?

Which countries got to have the most ships in the 5 Power treaty?

Was the London Naval Treaty successful?

Which country did the US and Britain allow a maximum naval tonnage of 315000 at the Washington Naval Conference?