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The American Journal of Comparative Law Vol. 59, No. 1 (WINTER 2011) , pp. 227-288 (62 pages) Published By: Oxford University Press https://www.jstor.org/stable/25766184 Read and download Log in through your school or library Read Online (Free) relies on page scans, which are not currently available to screen readers. To access this article, please contact JSTOR User Support. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.With a personal account, you can read up to 100 articles each month for free. Get StartedAlready have an account? Log in Monthly Plan
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Abstract The post-war experience of developing countries leads to two depressing conclusions: only a small number of countries have successfully developed; and development theory has not produced development. In this Article we examine one critical fact that might provide insights into the development conundrum: some autocratic regimes have fundamentally transformed their economies, despite serious deficiencies along a range of other dimensions. Our aim is to understand how growth came about in these regimes, and whether emerging democracies might learn something important from these experiences. Our thesis is that in these economically successful countries, the authoritarian regime managed a critical juncture in the country's development—entry into global commerce by the transition from small-scale, relational exchange, to exchange where performance is supported by government action, whether based on the potential for formal third party enforcement or by the threat of informal government sanctions. Compared to a weak democracy, a growth-favoring dictator may have an advantage in overcoming political economy obstacles to credibly committing that rent seeking will not dissipate private investment. We explore this hypothesis by examining the successful development experiences of three countries in the late twentieth century: Chile under Augusto Pinochet; South Korea under Park Chung-Hee; and China under Deng Xiaoping and his successors. Although the macroeconomic policies and institutional strategies of the three countries differed significantly, each ruler found ways to credibly commit his regime to growth. Decades of law reform activity by the World Bank, IMF, and other international organizations, along with a vast academic literature, assume that an impartial judiciary is the key to the transition from relational to market exchange. Our study reveals that a variety of alternatives are possible. We then consider a now familiar question raised about contemporary China: does economic development inexorably lead to political liberalization? The conventional wisdom says yes, drawing support from the experience of Chile and South Korea. We show that the conventional wisdom overlooks important features of the Chilean and Korean historical experiences that bear directly on China. The same incentive structures that have propelled Chinese economic growth are likely to slow political liberalization. Journal Information The American Journal of Comparative Law is the world's leading journal dedicated to the comparative study of law, as well as the critical analysis of foreign law and legal systems, and private international law. A peer-reviewed quarterly founded in 1952, the board of journal editors includes scholars with interests in the world's major legal systems and traditions. Authors from many disciplinary traditions including anthropology, economics, history, philosophy, political science, psychology, and sociology contribute to the journal. Publisher Information Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. OUP is the world's largest university press with the widest global presence. It currently publishes more than 6,000 new publications a year, has offices in around fifty countries, and employs more than 5,500 people worldwide. It has become familiar to millions through a diverse publishing program that includes scholarly works in all academic disciplines, bibles, music, school and college textbooks, business books, dictionaries and reference books, and academic journals. Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. Which of the following explains how the IMF affected the outcome of the Russian economic transition?Which of the following explains how the IMF affected the outcome of the Russian economic transition in the 1990s? The IMF provided financial assistance to Russia, which influenced the types of restructuring Russia could undertake.
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