Management Directive 110 In federal EEO law, there is a strong presumption that a complainant who prevails in whole or in part on a claim of discrimination is entitled to full relief which places him/her in the position s/he would have been in absent the agency's discriminatory conduct. See
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-419 (1975). This Chapter of the Management Directive sets forth guidance for use by agencies and persons seeking remedial relief in a variety of areas, including: back pay, front pay, attorney's fees and costs, awards of compensatory damages, and other forms of equitable relief. This guidance applies only to the federal sector
administrative process. When an agency or the Commission finds that an employee of the agency was discriminated against, the agency shall provide the individual with non-discriminatory placement into the position s/he would have occupied absent the discrimination. For cases in which the employee is not selected for a position or promotion due to
discrimination, this would include an offer of placement into the position sought, or a substantially equivalent position. See Carson v. Dep't. of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120100078 (Feb. 16, 2012). The offer should be made retroactive to the date of the selection in question. The individual should receive all step or pay increases and monetary benefits associated with the
position. See Stewart v. Dep't. of Homeland Security, EEOC Request No. 0520070124 (Nov. 14, 2011). A "substantially equivalent position" is a position within the same commuting area. Bakken v. Dep't. of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 0120093529 (Aug. 8, 2011). When
the relief ordered includes the offer of a position or a promotion, the offer shall be made to the complainant in writing, providing the complainant fifteen (15) days from receipt of the offer to notify the agency of the acceptance or rejection. Failure to respond within the 15-day time limit shall be construed as a declination. Any back pay liability shall cease to accrue with either the actual placement of the complainant into the position in question, or with the date the offer was
declined. In cases involving a discriminatory termination, the agency should offer to reinstate the complainant to his/her former position retroactive to the date of the termination. See Oni v. Dep't. of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 0720100015 (Oct. 11, 2011). The complainant should also receive all applicable benefits and step or pay increases. In some cases, there is evidence
that discrimination was one of multiple motivating factors for an employment action. In these "mixed motive" cases, the agency does not have to offer complainant the position sought if it can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action even absent the discrimination. See Montante v. Dep't. of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 0120110240
(Nov. 9, 2011), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 0520120259 (June 8, 2012). If the agency is able to make this demonstration, the complainant is not entitled to personal relief such as reinstatement, hiring, or promotion. The complainant may still be entitled to declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and/or attorneys' fees and costs. Id. When an individual accepts an offer of employment as a remedy for discrimination, s/he shall be deemed to have performed
service for the agency during the period he would have served but for the discrimination for all purposes except for meeting service requirements for completion of a required probationary or trial period. When an agency or the Commission finds
that an employee of the agency was discriminated against, the agency shall provide the individual with non-discriminatory placement into the position s/he would have occupied absent the discrimination, with back pay computed in the manner prescribed by 5 C.F.R. § 550.805. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(c)(1). The purpose of a back pay award is to restore to the complainant the income he would have otherwise earned but for the discrimination. See
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 418-419 (1975); Davis v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04900010 (Nov. 29, 1990). A number of discriminatory personnel actions can generate back pay. The most common actions generating back pay are: removals, suspensions,
denials of promotions, and failure to hire. Interest on back pay shall be included in the back pay computation. The back pay computation should also include any applicable step increases or pay differentials. See Morrow v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0720070058 (Nov. 13, 2009) (ordering the agency to provide complainant with a back pay award which included
interest, overtime, and night pay differential). Under Title VII, GINA, and the Rehabilitation Act, back pay is limited to two years prior to the date the discrimination complaint was filed. Back pay includes all forms of compensation and reflects fluctuations in working time, overtime rates, penalty overtime, Sunday premium and night work, changing
rates of pay, transfers, promotions, and privileges of employment. The Commission also construes "benefits" broadly to include annual leave, sick leave, health insurance, and retirement contributions. Vereb v. Dep't. of Justice, EEOC Petition No. 04980008 (Feb. 26, 1999); Holly v. U.S.
Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04A50003 (Nov. 2, 2005). [T]he Commission recognizes that precise measurement cannot always be used to remedy the wrong inflicted, and therefore, the computation of back pay awards inherently involves some speculation. Hanns v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04960030 (September 18, 1997). The Commission has held that uncertainties
involved in a back pay determination should be resolved against the agency that has already been found to have committed acts of discrimination. Id. See also Davis v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04900010 (Nov. 29, 1990); and Besemer v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC
Petition No. 04890005 (Dec. 14, 1989). C. Overtime or Premium Pay as a Component of Back PayBack pay will be required to cover any overtime or premium pay that would have been worked absent discrimination. The parties often disagree over whether overtime would have been worked and to what extent overtime could have been earned. The overtime component of a back pay award should generally be calculated based upon the average amount of overtime worked by similarly situated employees. Haines v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04A50018 (Nov. 23, 2005); Holly v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04A50003 (Nov. 2, 2005). If the position is unique, such that a comparison with a similarly situated employee is not possible, the agency should calculate overtime based on the actual overtime worked by the person who was selected for the position. See, for example, Bowman v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120112333 (Oct. 3, 2011), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 0520120091 (Mar. 16, 2012). D. Retirement Deductions and Back PayThe Commission has held that make whole relief requires the agency to make retroactive tax-deferred contributions to the complainant's retirement account for the relevant period. To the extent complainant would have received agency contributions to a retirement fund as a component of her salary, she is entitled to have her retirement benefits adjusted as part of her back pay award, including sums which the account would have earned during the relevant period. The agency should provide its calculations of the amount of contributions to the agency's retirement system that both it and complainant would have made during her absence, as well as the earnings which would have accrued. See Kretschmar v. Dep't. of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 04A40044 (Mar. 25, 2005). E. Interim Earnings Deducted from Back PayIf the complainant lost a job or did not receive a position due to discrimination, the complainant has the responsibility of mitigating the harm by looking for other work. Ghannam v. Agency for International Development, EEOC Appeal No. 01990574 (June 22, 2004). Wages earned by the employee while separated from the agency are commonly called "interim wages." The agency should deduct the interim wages earned by the complainant from the amount of back pay owed to the complainant as provided for in Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (5)(g). If the agency believes that the complainant did not do enough to mitigate lost wages, it must prove so by a preponderance of the evidence. See McNeil v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05960436 (Dec. 9, 1999). However, income that the complainant could have earned while still holding the position at the agency should not be subtracted or offset from back pay. "Moonlight" employment is employment that the employee could have engaged in even while federally employed. See 5 C.F.R. § 550.805(e)(1). See Paulk v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04A10026 (Oct. 4, 2001) (Commission found that petitioner's overtime earnings were earned from his working 65-80 hours per week in a position he acquired during the period subsequent to his termination from the agency, and thus petitioner could not have held both the supplemental job and the job he lost because of discrimination, and therefore, the agency properly offset these earnings from complainant's back pay award). F. Worker's Compensation Benefits May Be Partially Deductible from Back PayA Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) award is meant to compensate for lost wages and/or reparation for physical injury. A claim of back pay against a Federal agency during the same time period covered by a FECA claim would have the potential for a double recovery of back pay. Any portion of a FECA award attributable to lost wages during the back pay period in a discrimination finding will be deducted from the back pay award. The portion of the FECA award that is paid as reparation for physical injuries is not related to wages earned and should not be deducted. If the agency contends that receipt of workers' compensation would result in double recovery, the agency must determine what portion of the FECA benefits, if any, applied to back pay, leave and other benefits, and what portion of complainant's FECA benefits applied to reparation for physical injuries. See Ulloa v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04A30025 (Aug. 3, 2004). G. Availability for Work - Prerequisite for Receipt of Back PayThe applicable regulations provide that the amount of back pay awarded shall be reduced by the amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person discriminated against. Thus, the complainant has a duty to mitigate or lessen damages by making a reasonable good faith effort to find other employment. This means that the complainant must seek a substantially equivalent position, that is, a position that affords virtually identical compensation, job responsibilities, working conditions, status, and promotional opportunities as the position he was discriminatorily denied. See Knott v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0720100049 (July 5, 2010). As a general rule, a complainant must be ready, willing, and able to work during the period of back pay recovery in order to receive back pay. The Commission has stated that if an agency can present persuasive evidence that complainant was not able to work during the back pay period, back pay would not be awarded; however, the agency has the burden of proof. Morman v. Dep't. of Defense (Defense Commissary Agency), EEOC Petition No. 04A10006 (July 31, 2002). The back pay regulation 5 C.F.R. § 550.805(c) provides that periods of unavailability may not be included in the back pay period unless such periods of time are the result of an illness or injury related to an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action. When a complainant receives workers' compensation due to an agency's failure to provide reasonable accommodation, this does not preclude a back pay award. The receipt of workers' compensation benefits does not indicate that a person was unable to work during the back pay period. See McClendon v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04960013 (May 22, 1997). H. Unemployment Compensation Not Deducted from Back Pay - the Collateral Source RuleUnemployment compensation is an interim source of income, but it is a collateral source in the sense that it comes from the state - not the federal employer. An employer cannot set off or mitigate its damages through a collateral source - in this case the state's payment of unemployment compensation even though the employer might have contributed to the source. When a back payment is made where unemployment had been received, in theory the unemployment compensation represents an overpayment from the state and is due to the state. See Morra-Morrison v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04980023 (June 2, 1999). This process of recoupment is generally a matter between the complainant and the state. I. Tax Consequences of a Lump Sum Payment of Back PayThe Commission has recognized that an agency is liable for any increased tax liability resulting from receipt of a lump sum of back pay in a single tax year. When an individual receives back pay as a lump sum payment, s/he is entitled to a tax offset payment for the tax year in which she received the payment. Additionally, the individual will have the burden of establishing the amount of his/her increased federal income tax liability to the agency. See Mohar v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0720100019 (Aug. 29, 2011); Teresita Lorenzo v. Dep't. of Defense Education Activity, EEOC Petition No. 01A61644 (September 29, 2005); Warren Goetze v. Dep't. of the Navy, EEO Appeal No. 01991530 (Aug. 23, 2001). J. Liquidated Damages (ADEA and EPA only)Liquidated damages in Fair Labor Standards Act cases are generally monetary awards equal to, and in addition to, the back pay due to the complainant when a violation is found to be willful or in reckless disregard of the statutes. In Equal Pay Act cases, willfulness is not a required factor for liquidated damages. Such damages are available for a violation of the EPA unless the agency can prove that it acted in "good faith" and reasonably believed that its actions did not violate the EPA. A finding of willfulness under the EPA, however, may extend the limitations period on back pay from two (2) years to three (3) years. Since an EPA claim may also be brought as a sex-based wage discrimination claim under Title VII, compensatory damages may also be available if the claim is brought under both statutes. While liquidated damages for willful violations of the ADEA are available in the private sector under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(b), they are not available under the federal sector provisions at Sec. 633a (b). See Jacobson v. Shalala, EEO Request No. 0519930689, (June 2, 1994); Falks v. Rubin, EEOC Request No. 0519960250, (September 6, 1996); Amaro v. Potter, EEOC Appeal No. 0120020929, (May 29, 2003). K. Restoration of LeaveWhere there has been a finding of discrimination, the complainant is entitled to back pay for time lost from work during the applicable periods, as well as the restoration of any leave used because of the agency's discriminatory actions. Cox v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 0720050055 (Dec. 24, 2009). For example, the restoration of leave taken for purposes of avoiding or recovering from a discriminatory hostile work environment is a valid component of equitable relief. See Burton v. Dep't. of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0720090046 (June 9, 2011); see also Lamb v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 0120103232 (Mar. 21, 2012) (leave restoration ordered where denial of reasonable accommodation resulted in leave usage); Complainant v. Dep't. of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 0120084008 (July 6, 2014) (leave restoration ordered where leave used in lieu of improperly denied official time). IV. FRONT PAYFront pay is an equitable remedy that compensates an individual when reinstatement is not possible in certain limited circumstances. The Commission has held that front pay may be awarded in lieu of reinstatement when: (1) no position is available; (2) a subsequent working relationship between the parties would be antagonistic; or (3) the employer has a record of long-term resistance to anti-discrimination efforts. Brinkley v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No, 05980429 (Aug. 12, 1999). The fact that front pay is awarded in lieu of reinstatement implies that the complainant is able to work but cannot do so because of circumstances external to the complainant. See Cook v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01950027 (July 17, 1998). The Commission has held that front pay is an equitable remedy to be awarded for a reasonable future period required for the victim of discrimination to reestablish his rightful place in the job market. See Deidra Brown-Fleming v. Dep't. of Justice, EEOC Petition No. 0420080016 (Oct. 28, 2010). V. OTHER FORMS OF EQUITABLE RELIEFAs appropriate, the agency shall also:
When the finding of discrimination involves a performance appraisal, the appropriate relief should include raising the rating to that which the individual would have received absent the discrimination. McKenzie v. Dep't. of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120100034 (July 7, 2011); Hairston v. Dep't. of Education, EEOC Appeal No. 0120071308 (Apr. 15, 2010). In addition, the individual is entitled to all benefits and awards that s/he would have received if she had achieved the higher performance appraisal rating. Cook v. Dep't. of Labor, EEOC Appeal No. 0720080045 (Feb. 22, 2010). It is also appropriate to order training for agency personnel found to have engaged in discrimination, and to consider taking disciplinary action against those officials who engaged in the discrimination.[3] See James v. Dep't. of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 0120073831 (September 22, 2009), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 0520100086 (Mar. 22, 2010) (ordering the agency to provide the Selecting Official who discriminated against complainant 16 hours of EEO training and to consider taking disciplinary action against the official). The Commission does not consider training to be "discipline." See Morrow v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0720070058 (Nov. 13, 2009). For example, in Burton v. Dep't. of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0720090046 (June 9, 2011), one of the responsible management officials found to have engaged in unlawful discrimination and retaliation was a high-level management official who set the leadership tone for the entire facility, and, thus, requiring five hours of EEO training for all facility management and supervisory staff was appropriate. See also Kitson v. Dep't. of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0720100052 (Feb. 15, 2011), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 0520110312 (June 10, 2011) (ordering the agency to provide training for upper-level employees at an agency facility following a finding of discriminatory non-selection); Wagner v. Dep't. of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 0120103125 (Dec. 1, 2010) (ordering the agency to provide EEO training to all employees at an agency facility following a finding that agency managers and employees subjected complainant to a hostile work environment). The Commission has also found that, in cases involving discriminatory policies or practices, the appropriate relief includes ordering the agency to "cease and desist" from adhering to that policy or practice. For example, in Smith v. Dep't. of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 0120082983 (Feb. 16, 2010), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 0520100287 (July 9, 2010), the Commission ordered the agency to cease and desist from requiring that all contact with EEO Counselors be arranged by management officials. Following a finding of discrimination, the agency should take steps to ensure that the same type of action does not recur. In Cheeks v. Dep't. of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 0120091345 (Feb. 1, 2012), the agency was found to have engaged in racial harassment. The agency was ordered to take all necessary steps to ensure that complainant had no contact with the supervisor responsible for the harassment, as well as to provide complainant with a designated management official to whom he could report any subsequent acts of harassment. See also Ighile v. Dep't. of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0720110010 (Apr. 13, 2012) (ordering the agency to cease and desist from all hostile conduct directed to complainant, and take appropriate action to ensure that his co-workers cease and desist from any hostile conduct). VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTSA. IntroductionAttorney's fees and costs shall be awarded in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). In federal EEO law, there is a strong presumption that a complainant who prevails in whole or in part on a claim of discrimination is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs. More specifically, complainants who prevail on claims alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, are presumptively entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs, unless special circumstances render such an award unjust. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1). (Complainants prevailing on claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, as amended, are not entitled to attorney's fees at the administrative level.) Only where a Title VII, GINA, or Rehabilitation Act complainant rejects an offer of resolution made in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(c) and does not obtain more relief than the agency had offered, or in the rarest of other circumstances, might an agency limit or deny an award of fees. B. Determination of Prevailing Party Status
C. Presumption of Entitlement
D. Awards to Prevailing Parties in Negotiated Settlements
E. Awards of Costs and Fees for Expert and Non-Lawyer Services
F. Computation of Attorney's Fees
G. Contents of Fee Application and Procedure for Determination
H. Miscellaneous Issues
VII. COMPENSATORY DAMAGESCompensatory damages are awarded to compensate a complaining party for losses or suffering inflicted due to the discriminatory act or conduct. See Carey v. Piphus 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978)(purpose of damages is to "compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights"). Compensatory damages "may be had for any proximate consequences which can be established with requisite certainty." 22 Am Jur 2d Damages § 45 (1965) Compensatory damages include damages for past pecuniary loss (out-of-pocket loss), future pecuniary loss, and nonpecuniary loss (emotional harm). See Goetze v. Dep't. of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01991530 (Aug. 23, 2001). A. Entitlement to Seek Compensatory Damages
B. Legal Principles
[1] See Sipriano v. Dep't. of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0120103167 (Jan. 20, 2011), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 0520110313(May 12, 2011) (ordering the agency to expunge all documentation relating to a discriminatory termination from complainant's records); Farrington v. Dep't. of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0720090011 (Jan. 19, 2011), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 0520110295(May 12, 2011) (ordering the agency to expunge evaluation reports and documents referencing a discriminatory investigation). [2] See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(c). [3] In fact, the Commission strongly urges that agencies include consideration of disciplinary action in all agency orders on findings of intentional discrimination. In certain circumstances, training may be ordered for additional agency managers and staff. [4] Where the parties enter into a settlement agreement that provides for but does not quantify the amount of attorney's fees and costs, the attorney should submit his/her statement of fees and costs and supporting documentation to the agency for determination of the amount due. The agency should issue a decision on fees within 60 days of receipt of the statement and supporting documentation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(A). If the complainant disputes the amount awarded, s/he may file an appeal with the Commission. [5] Where the Commission finds discrimination in a case in which the agency takes final action under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(a), the Commission will remand the case to the Administrative Judge for a determination of attorney's fees. Where the decision on appeal originates from a case handled exclusively by the agency (that is, where the complainant elected a final agency decision under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b)), the Commission will remand the case to the agency for a determination of attorney's fees. [6] Pendente lite is Latin for awaiting the litigation (lawsuit). It is applied to court orders (such as temporary child support) which are in effect until the case is tried, or rights that cannot be enforced until the lawsuit is over. What is the first step a plaintiff would establish in order to prove disparate treatment discrimination in an employment case under Title VII?What is the first step a plaintiff would establish in order to prove disparate-treatment discrimination in an employment case under Title VII? A. The plaintiff would demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination.
What is disparate treatment under Title VII?(a) Disparate Treatment -
Discrimination within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 can take many forms. It can occur when an employer or other person subject to the Act intentionally excludes individuals from an employment opportunity on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
What are the four 4 parts of a disparate treatment discrimination claim?To support a disparate treatment claim, you need to establish four elements:. The individual is a member of a protected class;. The employer knows of the individual's protected class;. A harmful act occurred; and.. Other similarly situated individuals were treated more favorably or not subjected to the same treatment.. What is the first step a plaintiff would establish in order to prove disparate?A plaintiff proves a disparate impact case by firstly: establishing statistically that the rule disproportionately restricts employment opportunities for a protected class.
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